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China’s policy makers see international standards as a barrier to their country’s 
economic development, more importantly, as an offence to the country’s national pride. This 
belief has been reinforced by the view that multi-national companies have used international 
standards to force developing countries to deprive them of the ability to enter the 
international markets by forcing them to pay high royalty rates, due to the patents 
incorporated in these standards. Moreover, these standards, as they believe, have been created 
at international standards setting platforms dominated by multi-national companies and 
developed countries. In return, China has launched several initiatives to create home-made 
Chinese standards free from patent claims of these companies. China’s home-made 
 vi 
standards, some of which differ significantly from international standards, also reportedly 
serve to protection of its domestic market. 
China’s accession to the WTO was formally approved in November 2001 and 
China became the WTO’s 143rd member on December 11, 2001. WTO membership 
opened a new era for China. In spite of the international expectations for removal of all 
trade protection mechanisms which are incompatible with the international trade regime, 
China is reported to have sought to reform its policies by employing new strategies 
concerning IPR and standards. 
The thesis of this report is that China has not diverged significantly from developing 
home-made Chinese standards after the country’s entry into the WTO, but Chinese 
authorities have adopted more flexible strategies to implement this policy. Accordingly, this 
report is about change in policy strategies. I argue that China has continued to enforce its 
own will upon foreign companies with a strong self-confidence stemming from its ability to 
negotiate on unequal terms with foreign companies, owing to its sheer market size. However, 
China‟s new strategies have been shaped by weak coordination and disagreement among 
government agencies and institutions. 
To illustrate the potential explanatory power of this account, I have examined two 
important home-made standards initiatives by China; Wireless Authentication and 
Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) and Audio Video Coding Standards (AVS). From the 
examination of the WAPI and AVS cases, I conclude that China‟s strategies have 
continued to evolve through disagreements and negotiations between Chinese 
government institutions within policy boundaries set by China‟s WTO membership and 
increasing international criticism.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
China‟s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) represents a 
significant step towards China‟s integration to the world economy. In this process, China 
has agreed and announced to remove non-tariff barriers to international trade by signing 
the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) and guaranteed full protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) by signing the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). 
China‟s economic growth attracts international attention from foreign companies 
and governments interested in benefiting from China‟s growing economy, while 
worrying about China‟s restrictive policies. Over the last years since the accession time, 
problems concerning China‟s WTO membership transition problems and removal of 
trade restrictions have given way to new questions about non-tariff barriers and concerns 
over IPR protection in China. This study and report have also flourished from such a 
curiosity.  
Views about the importance of technology standards for economic development 
have never been as stark as in the case of China. In fact, China has launched several 
initiatives to create home-made Chinese standards, some of which differ significantly 
from international standards. These initiatives are hardly novel from an industrial policy 
perspective, as other countries have also developed and used national standards to protect 
their national markets, tariffs and other protective measures aside. However, China‟s 
view of and reaction to the foreign patents incorporated in international standards as a 
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barrier to the development of developing countries, specifically of China‟s high 
technology sectors, diverge from this tradition. 
China seeks to increase its relative gains from its participation in the global 
economy. To this end, the Chinese government has designed and pursued an ambitious 
national technology policy on a gigantic scale. This policy includes a set of policy 
instruments and strategies for domestic research and development, specifically to the 
benefit of Chinese companies in high technology sectors through the building of a 
Chinese intellectual property portfolio to incorporate into home-made Chinese standards. 
Hence, foreign governments and companies are concerned about the motives behind 
China‟s home-made standards initiatives, as the stakes in these policy initiatives are high 
for them (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 1).  
China‟s policy makers have continued to see international standards, particularly 
technology standards, as a barrier to their country‟s economic development, more 
importantly, as an offence to the country‟s national pride. This belief has been reinforced 
by the view that foreign companies have used international standards to force developing 
countries to deprive them of the ability to enter the international markets by forcing them 
to pay high royalty rates, due to the patents incorporated in these standards. Moreover, 
these standards, as they believe, have been created at international standards setting 
platforms dominated by multi-national companies and developed countries. 
There are many cases verifying that other countries have also used their national 
standards as non-tariff barriers to the entry into their markets. Some of them have even 
successfully benefited from adoption of their national standards as international 
standards, by taking advantage of their control over the necessary technologies to 
dominate international markets and of required royalty payments. 
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Interestingly, the expectation was that China need to compensate for the benefits 
of WTO membership (market access, most favored nation status, etc.) by removing its 
protective trade regime and adhering to the international legal framework drawn by the 
WTO. However, instead of removing all its protection mechanisms which are 
incompatible with the international trade regime, China is reported to have sought to 
reform its policies by employing new strategies concerning IPR and standards in 
particular. According to Suttmeier, Yao and Tan (2006,1): “China has attempted to 
develop a new national standards strategy to reform the Chinese domestic standards 
regime and bring it into conformity with China‟s WTO obligations.”  
This report seeks to understand how and to what extent China has diverged from 
its well known policies of creating home-made Chinese standards and acquiring foreign 
technology after its entry into the WTO. 
The thesis of this report is that China has not diverged significantly from 
developing home-made Chinese standards after the country‟s entry into the WTO, but 
Chinese authorities have adopted more flexible strategies to implement this policy. 
Accordingly, this report is about change in policy strategies. I argue that China has 
continued to enforce its own will upon foreign companies with a strong self-confidence 
stemming from its ability to negotiate on unequal terms with foreign companies, owing to 
its sheer market size. However incompatible these strategies with the principles of the 
WTO, China still plays the game with its own rules. 
However, as explored in greater detail later, China‟s new strategies have been 
shaped by weak coordination and disagreements among government agencies and 
institutions. In so far as, it is not viable to talk about a well planned effort surrounding a 
policy or a strategy, despite the existence of clear lines.  
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To illustrate the potential explanatory power of this account, this report seeks to 
examine two important home-made standards initiatives; Wireless Authentication and 
Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) and Audio Video Coding Standards (AVS).  
WAPI has been the subject of an international dispute and wide scale scholarly 
interest. The United States Trade Commission brought the case to the international arena, 
and the case created tremendous tension between the US and China. Eventually, China 
retreated from using the standard as a mandatory standard binding for all the sectors. 
Therefore, many regard WAPI as a failure for China, even though China still insists on 
using the standard on a „voluntary basis‟ by employing a different set of strategies. 
While, the AVS initiative has emerged after China‟s entry into the WTO. The 
AVS working group and the patent pool have been highly admired by international 
observers for its openness and transparency 
In its investigation report about the „indigenous innovation policies‟ in China, the 
United States International Trade Commission (2010, 5-6) has described the role played 
by China‟s home-made standards efforts in this technology policy framework by 
categorizing the Chinese strategies in seven steps. According to this classification by the 
Commission; Chinese government begins with a Chinese high technology company with 
potential, in the second stage, the government brings in outside technical talent, often a 
Chinese American or a Chinese citizen working abroad, in the third stage of the process, 
the government uses public procurement and government purchases to favor the new 
product, allowing the company to build market share and acceptance of the brand, in the 
fourth stage home-made Chinese standards are introduced, agencies develop a standard 
that favors the new product, making it more difficult for foreign companies to compete in 
the Chinese market, in the fifth stage the government seeks approval of the new standard 
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from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or another international 
standards body when product gains acceptance in China, increasing its export potential, 
in the sixth stage government starts to fund at concessional rates or zero cost helping 
promote additional company growth, and lastly the government uses the anti-monopoly 
law to achieve technology transfer from foreign companies through enforcement of either 
(1) abuse of the dominance provisions or (2) compulsory licensing provisions of the 
Patent Law. 
However, one of the conclusions of this study from the examination of the WAPI 
and AVS cases is that it is not feasible to explain and classify the Chinese strategies 
surrounding these cases with such a well planned approach. These strategies have 
continued to evolve through disagreements and negotiations between the Chinese 
government institutions within policy boundaries set by China‟s WTO membership and 
increasing international criticism. It is, nevertheless, clear that these strategies appear not 
to have been well planned but to be set into motion by policy makers continuing searches 
for best fit models and strategies. 
In analyzing these cases, I have relied on available evidence provided by the 
review of the literature and English and Chinese news sources, as well as interviews 
conducted with some of the key people involved in the AVS initiative, some US business 
associations, experts on Chinese business law and an international law scholar. However, 
none of the companies in the AVS working group have accepted to be interviewed about 
the role played by the Chinese government in their entry to the working group and the 
patent pool, which might reflect their sense of uneasiness with the Chinese government. 
This report is divided into six chapters. The second chapter analyzes the 
theoretical and historical background of China‟s policies of developing home-made 
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Chinese standards within the framework of „indigenous innovation policies.‟ In trying to 
explain this background, I have first looked at the role played by technology, particularly 
compatibility, standards in countries‟ overall technology policies; secondly experiences 
of other East Asian countries, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, from which China 
allegedly drew inspiration for its technology policies; thirdly the international law 
surrounding these cases and lastly history of „Indigenous Innovation Policies.‟ 
China‟s differences with other East Asian nations are as important as its 
similarities. China‟s technology practices and strategies concerning Chinese standards 
would clearly not work for South Korea„s industry giants and Taiwan„s small scale 
manufacturers due mostly to their small market size and dependence on international 
trade. On the other hand, Japan has previously tried, on many occasions, to promote 
discriminatory standards to protect distressed or strategically important industries. These 
efforts would eventually help prompt revisions to the GATT and the inclusion of the 
Technical Barriers to Trade provisions in the WTO regime. Moreover, Japan, for a long 
time, used its domestic market as a carrot to the foreign companies to extract foreign 
technology for its companies through joint ventures whose terms and conditions were 
checked and controlled strictly by the government. Japan also sets an example for China 
for the limits of government led national standardization efforts. 
After establishing the theoretical and historical foundations of the analyses of the 
strategy change that I seek to configure, I proceed in Chapter three to examine the WAPI 
case in order to be able to properly to understand the background of China‟s changing 
policy strategies with the release of the „Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper.‟ A major 
finding of this chapter is that; although, China has withdrawn from its preliminary policy 
position of imposing the WAPI standard mandatorily and confronting the multi-national 
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companies and their governments while trying to promote the standard at the 
international standards bodies, the country has started to implement a more delicate 
approach of promoting the standard in its domestic market through public procurement 
and government institutions and supporting coalitions with multi-national companies. For 
the Chinese policy makers, WTO membership does not present a cutting edge policy 
change, but rather it pawed the way for the evolution of Chinese policy strategies under 
new and more challenging constrains. For instance, the explanation that I develop to 
account for the change in attitudes in terms of transparency and openness in the WAPI 
initiative is that Chinese authorities have learned a lesson from their attempt to introduce 
a Chinese alternative to the DVD, the EVD that failed in the market in 2003. 
An analysis of  the WAPI case reveals that Chinese manufacturers are  interested 
more in the additional transaction costs associated with use of a new standard which 
might not be accepted by the Global market, rather than the arguments of the Chinese 
government for the ‘intolerable royalty rates’ for the patents incorporated in the existing 
standards.    
This chapter also discusses the legal implications of the WAPI initiative from an 
international perspective. The last section also looks at „the Indigenous Innovation Policy 
Paper‟ and the policies which have gained momentum with the release of this policy 
paper. From the examination of the cases, it is viable to claim that the obstacles facing the 
Chinese standards in the post-WTO era for China and the restrictions of the membership 
would pave the way for China‟s Indigenous Innovation Policy Report and policies, with a 
multiple new strategies. It is also presumable to conclude that the drawback China lived 
in the WAPI case and other similar issues have played a decisive role in the 
developments leading to the release of this policy paper.    
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The fourth chapter examines the development of the AVS initiative and China‟s 
new strategies for promoting the standard, and discusses some of the changing patterns of 
China‟s technological policy strategies in this case. One of the important findings of this 
chapter is that companies’ motivation for participation into the AVS working group 
and/or patent pool seems to have stemmed from their concern that their access to the 
Chinese market might be restricted for their non-compliance with this initiative. An 
analysis of this initiative implies that China has diverged from its early strategies and 
learned not to focus its efforts on a single standard and associated technologies which 
might fail in the market. And, similar to other standards initiatives in China, the Chinese 
government‟s support for and the adoption to the AVS standard are not smooth processes 
and on many occasions slowed by the lack of coordination and disputes among different 
government institutions or interest groups. 
More importantly, even from casual observation of the sector in China, it is clear 
that the sector is hesitant about adapting to the AVS standard. This situation poses more 
questions about the success of the Chinese government in creating royalty free standards 
for the Chinese manufacturers. Chinese manufacturers seem to use both the Chinese AVS 
standard and internationally accepted standards at the same time through ensuring inter-
operability. 
This chapter concludes that despite the success of some of these strategies 
examined in this chapter, the overall achievements are limited with respect to various 
aspects of China‟s policy objectives. 
The fifth chapter consists of comparison of the WAPI and AVS cases by 
configuring the main policy lines therein before proceeding to the chapter six. The critical 
finding of this chapter is that Chinese institutions have proved their organizational 
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capability to learn from their policy experiences. In this regard, to replace core foreign 
technology in critical infrastructure, the Chinese government benefit from a variety of 
tools, such as a foreign-focused anti-monopoly law, mandatory technology transfers, 
compulsory technology licensing, rigged Chinese standards and testing rules, local 
content requirements, mandates to reveal encryption codes, excessive disclosure for 
scientific permits and technology patents, discriminatory government procurement 
policies, and the continued failure to adequately protect intellectual property rights. 
Most of the China‟s strategies are not novel; however, they are implemented 
within the new framework of the WTO and attract more international attention than other 
countries due to the size of the Chinese economy. From the examination of the WAPI and 
the AVS cases, it stands out that China focuses its efforts on getting the consent of 
foreign companies and ensuring their participation to stay away from a direct 
confrontation with foreign governments and disputes under the international trade law. 
Chapter six interprets the observations and findings made in the previous chapters 
and concludes with a discussion of China‟s new policy strategies with respect to a WTO 
panel decision. The main finding of this chapter is that some of China‟s new strategies 
are probably still incompatible with the WTO rules and principles, and that China, 
instead, seeks to support coalitions among government institutions and foreign companies 
to prevent any trade dispute either at the WTO or with other countries. However, China’s 
new strategies give the country the leverage to make it harder for the foreign stakeholders 




Chapter 2: Theoretical and Historical Background 
 
This chapter analyzes the theoretical and historical background of Chinese 
policies concerning China‟s home-made standards initiatives within the context of 
China‟s integration into the world economy.  The first section of this chapter analyzes 
some important aspects of standards, particularly compatibility standards, for high 
technology companies and technology policies. Second part studies some of the key the 
national standardization and foreign technology acquisition policies of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, three East Asian countries from which China arguably drew 
inspiration for its government led industrialization and economic growth model. The 
following section examines the WTO law surrounding the WAPI and AVS initiatives and 
China‟s WTO commitments. The last section examines the history of China‟s indigenous 
innovation polices and its implementation to provide the framework through which 
Chinese policy strategies change and evolve, as examined in these two cases in the 
following chapters. After establishing the theoretical and historical foundations of the 
analyses of the China‟s home-made standards initiatives, I proceed in chapter three to 
examine the WAPI case. 
STANDARDS AS TECHNOLOGY POLICY TOOL 
Standards have the capability to become an industrial policy tool for three basic 
reasons. First of all, many accept that standards expand markets by allowing 
compatibility through network effects, particularly in information and communication 
technologies. Greenstein and Stango (2007, 1) have defined technological standards as a 
cornerstone of the modern information economy and argued that: “these standards affect 
firm strategy, market performance and, by extension, economic growth.” 
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 Within the scope of this report, standards we investigate are compatibility 
standards which are generally critical for electronics, information and telecommunication 
industries. Throughout this report terms „standards,‟ „technology standards‟ and 
„compatibility standards‟ are used interchangeably.   
Compatibility standards define the interface requirements allowing different core 
products, often from different manufacturers, to use the same complementary goods and 
services, or be connected together in networks. Typically complements are other 
products, but they may also be services, such as maintenance networks, or direct 
networks of the same product, such as telephones or airline routes (Grindley 1995, 9). 
Compatibility standards are an essential prerequisite for much of the information 
technology sectors, including computing, software, networking, and telecommunications 
products. Products in these sectors derive much or all of their utility from the 
interoperability obtained by implementing compatibility standards (Joel 2007, 93).  
Greenstein and Stango (2007, 8), for instance, have highlighted the rapidly 
globalizing role of information and telecommunication industries and the multinational 
manufacturers and telecom carriers operating at the global scale and competing for 
market dominance in a single national market and further in the global market.  They 
have also argued that: “competition in these industries often means competition in 
establishing as a standard a particular technology that is favorable to its owner or 
supporters, and thereby the standard owner can dominate a market where the standard is 
widely and inevitably used.” In this context, standards not only help market growth by 
ensuring compatibility, but also give companies an opportunity to gain market advantage 
and dominance by establishing a dominant standard.  
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Moreover, Pelkmans and Beuer (Pelkmans and Rita 1987, 210) have also stressed 
the importance of standardization decisions in the presence of strong network 
externalities and large economies of scale as decisive determinants of competiveness: 
“Incompatibilities in the network, between networks as a whole and between different 
generations of a technology may lead to such costly adaptations that at the end enterprises 
may as a result of consumer preferences for compatibility for different products.”  
Many agree on that standards can help to grow the market size and bring 
sustained value to user and vendors and provide stability. 
Acceptance of standards as de-facto standards by international markets or 
formally by international standard setting bodies might pose challenges for other 
countries which have not been a part of these standardization practices. As discussed in 
the next chapter, this trait of international standards setting process is the main pillar of 
China‟s criticism towards international standards. According to Shapiro and Varian 
(1998, 237): “Most standard setting takes place through formal standard-setting processes 
established by various standards bodies, never before have such cooperative, political 
processes been so important to market competition.”  Funk and Methe (2001) have 
recognized this trend that standards are increasingly decided by coalitions built around 
formal standard setting committees. They have also found that firms and governments 
have learned with experience gained with each generation of products.  “European and 
Japanese coalitions of firms for the third generation [of mobile communication devices] 
were aimed at influencing the selection process of standard setting committees, which in 
turn affected the forecasted installed base. By understanding that committee actions can 
be effective means to jump-start the move in the market to the next generation, firms 
have attempted to pre-empt pure market based coalitions from having an effect” (20). Lee 
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and Oh (2008) have also shared this view by saying that: “decisions on standards design 
and implementation are not normally made on the basis of rational–logical process, but 
constructed through the constant realignment of interests among the actors involved.” 
In this framework, „standards wars‟ as defined by Langlois (2007) between these 
interest groups, either companies or the governments that represent them, have become 
decisive for the success of new technologies. Through standards wars, “two new 
incompatible technologies struggle to become a de facto standard at various levels” 
(Shapiro and Varian 1998, 261). In addition, according to Grindley (1995, 31) standards 
wars would be a struggle for existence for firms as in many cases: “open standards are 
created by groups of firms united in competing against a proprietary standard to avoid 
being shut out of the market.”  
 In standards wars between firms or consortium of firms acting together, 
countries‟ stand and policies attract considerable international attention. Cabral and 
Kretschmer (2007, 329-330) have highlighted the role of public policy in standards 
battles, given the importance of network industries. Countries may leave the decisive 
decisions concerning standards to the self-decision mechanisms of markets and firms, as 
well as decide on standards at a very early state.  The high-definition television (HDTV) 
and mobile telecommunications are noteworthy cases in this respect.  
Public policies have differed greatly between Europe and the US. Whereas, in 
many cases, the European Commission (EC) choose to focus primarily on early 
standardization, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has adopted the 
more patient approach of letting market forces decide the winning standard (330).  
Many observers of standards setting activities agree that alliances between 
industry and government are required for the development of de jure standards 
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(Backhouse, Hsu and Silva 2006, 420). Therefore, governments have a strong impact on 
the creation of global standards in the information and telecommunication industries 
(Funk and Methe 2001). Funk (1998) has provided an explanation for the role of 
governments in international standard setting, as firms benefit from their countries‟ 
national standards becoming global standards.  Hence, they tend to collaborate with their 
governments, and solicit political support. International mobile telecommunications 
standards, for instance, have emerged through a hybrid process of committee and market 
mechanisms where firms and governments have collaborated (Lee and Oh 2008, 665).  
More importantly, recently developing countries have also started to involve in 
international standard setting activities and try to create their own standards and promote 
them to the international arena. Lee and Oh (2008, 665) have argued, for instance, that: 
Rapid development of technologies leading to an increasingly shorter life-cycle of 
ICT products is another factor which gives newcomers an opportunity to participate in 
standards setting in areas where products/services using the Standard are not mature 
enough for a de facto standard to emerge from market competition. In such cases 
anticipatory standards are developed and new comers can make their proposals for 
standards when there are innovation capabilities (Korea) or attractive market size 
(China). 
Besides, the advantages of adoption of national standards as international 
standards from a single country perspective include license payments for the patents 
incorporated into international standards. In addition, vendor companies can use the 
patents to raise the cost to competitors, perhaps to prohibitive levels (Greenstein and 
Stango 2007, 101-102). For non-integrated firms that supply technology but not 
implementation, to have patents incorporated into the standards is a crucial part of 
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business models. Beyond patents, some potential implementers might have an interest in 
influencing the standard setting processes in a direction that will give them a competitive 
advantage in implementation. However, such situations and cases are rarely documented 
(105-106). 
Mackie-Mason and Netz (2007, 240) have also shared a similar concern over 
designing royalty-bearing standards through which an interface specification consortium 
can harm component competition.  
From the analyses of the compatibility standards and their IP related aspects, the 
overall impression is that the issues concerning standards might burden developing 
country companies trying to enter developed country markets without violating IP rights. 
In fact, this is exactly what Chinese policy makers have pointed out.  
Yan (2007, 23) has attributed the rising interest of standard setting by the Chinese 
government to its strategic response to globalization and the global economy, where 
standards have become an important tool to leverage gains in international production 
networks. As, “the Chinese policy highlights the internal technology breakthrough 
through the efforts of China originated technology development, instead of borrowing 
imported technology from other countries, hence to improve the overall R&D level and 
lift its technology competency in global production network” (H. Yan 2007, 23-24). 
The feeling that Chinese export manufacturing industry has to pay substantial 
royalties to foreign patent holders and that foreigners are reluctant to allow China to 
develop its own technological capacity has paved the way for the motivation for China„s 
home-made standards in this respect. China sees international standards and patents hold 
by multi-national companies as means to deter developing countries from creating their 
own techno-industrial base. The DVD (Dissociated Vertical Deviation) players‟ IPR 
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dispute is worth mentioning here to exemplify this sense, where Chinese manufacturers 
pointed their fingers to the DVD patent alliances and consortiums for market distortion 
(Redfearn and Rouse 2009). 
In this regard, what make China unique among other developing countries are its 
deliberately pursued policies towards creating its own home-made standards, to become a 
standard-settler country.   
 
Technology Chinese Standards International Standards 
Audio-visual Coding AVS MPEG2, MPEG4-3 (AAC), 
MPEG4-10 (H.264), VC-1 
Digital Trunking GoTa, GT800 TETRA, iDEN 
Digital Video Players EVD, HDV, HVD Blu-ray, HD-DVD 
Document Formatting UOF ODF, OOXML 
Home Networking IGRS, ITopHome DLNA, UPnP, KNX, 
ECHONET 
Mobile Phone Charger YD/T1591-2006 None 
Mobile TV CMMB, T-MMB, CDMB, 
DMB-T, CMB 
DVB-H, T-DMB, MediaFLO 
Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) 
NPC ISO 18000 and others, 
EPC/GS1, uID 
Security Computer Chip TCM TPM 
Third-generation Cellular 
Telephony (3G) 
TD-SCDMA WCDMA, CDMA2000 
Wireless Local Area Network WAPI Wi-Fi 
Wireless Metro Area Network McWILL WiMAX 
Table 1: Major Chinese Standards Initiatives (Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su 2008). 
According to Lee and Oh (2008, 665), two factors are apparently responsible for 
this new phenomenon. First, the technological capabilities of China, as a fast growing 
country, have become sophisticated enough to encourage the government to develop their 
own standards. And, the technology gap between China and other developed nations have 
narrowed. These two factors enable China as a new comer to encroach into the 
competition for international standards. 
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The next section summarizes some of the key cases from other East Asian 
countries‟ experiences with home-made standards initiatives and foreign technology 
acquisition strategies. This chapter serves to help better understand the background of 
China‟s policies.   
OTHER EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 
According to a World Bank report, Government intervention has played a positive 
role in promoting economic growth in high growth economies of East Asia (World Bank 
1993)  and in these countries, government intervention took several forms, from exchange 
rate management to picking winners (Linden 2003, 1). China has used several policies to 
catch up with world„s technology leaders, particularly in telecommunication and 
electronics sectors (3). In fact, many believe that electronics sector has been a major 
contributor to growth in East Asia (Ernst and David 1992). Apparently, China has drawn 
inspiration from and sometimes followed the footsteps of other East Asian nations in the 
industrial and technology policy field.  
However, Chinese policies differ from other East Asian nations to the extent that 
is defined by three factors; existence of foreign companies in China„s large domestic 
market which has led to international pressure, China„s WTO membership to gain 
preferential treatment, and the bargaining power of the country stemming from its large 
market. Keister (1998) has contended that China‟s large market allows it to have the 
strengths of different models without necessarily weaknesses. 
 For instance, a United States – China Economic Security Review Commission 
report has made the following observation: 
Chinese industrial policy shares with the industrial policy experiences of other 
East Asian countries in having both successes and failures. The successes, often achieved 
18 
 
at great - and in some cases, arguably, unnecessary - costs have come as a part of the 
national ―catch up‖ strategies that have transformed poor agricultural countries in the 
region into the ranks of technologically capable, middle-or wealthy country status. The 
ability to mobilize resources and direct them towards state selected priority sectors has 
been the key to this catch-up strategy. (U.S. - China Economic and Security Review 
Commission 2009, 132) 
Nevertheless, China‟s differences with other industrialized nations are as 
important as its similarities in this regard. In comparing other East Asian countries where 
foreign direct investment stocks compromise a significant share of their economies with 
China, Chinese uniqueness can be apprehended. Such practices and strategies would 
clearly not work for South Korea„s industry giants and Taiwan„s small scale 
manufacturers due mostly to their small market size and dependence on international 
trade. 
 When comparing China with Japan, Kennedy (2006) has observed that Japan 
preferred to license technology rather than allow foreign investment and joint ventures. In 
2000, the stock of foreign direct investment accounted for 17.9% of China„s GDP; the 
comparable figure for Japan was a only 1.1%.55. As a result, there has been less internal 
opposition within and outside Japan to a variety of non-tariff barriers among other things, 
including discriminatory standards (60).  
These differences between the size and features of economies provide an 





Japan has been one of the most notorious countries in terms of protecting its 
domestic market with non-tariff measures, including national standards and burdensome 
conformity assessment procedures. However, many believe that the country has failed in 
promoting its national standards as internationally standards. 
Japan‟s use of national standards as a non-tariff barrier to international trade is 
widely publicized. Japan is not alone for pursuing such policies. Many countries have 
attempted to use standards as a policy tool to protect their domestic market and as a 
means to favor domestic producers in ways that capture national advantage from 
participation in the global economy. Japan has previously tried, on many occasions, to 
promote discriminatory standards to protect distressed or strategically important 
industries. These efforts would help prompt revisions to the GATT and the inclusion of 
the Technical Barriers to Trade provisions in the WTO regime (McIntyre 1997, 146). 
Stern (1997, 80) has also explained Japan‟s motivation for using standards that 
attempt to replace foreign technology or burden foreign competitors with the country‟s 
goals to reduce business risk to its companies. In 1984, American PBX makers, for 
instance, complained that secret standards for voice quality, based upon a mechanical ear 
that existed only in Tokyo and Geneva, would create a barrier to their operations in 
Japan. In another well known case, American computer peripheral companies complained 
about a proposed Japanese standard for interruptible power supplies that would act as 
drag on American gains in market share. 
History of the US and Japan trade relations has provided us with so many similar 
cases exemplifying Japanese policies (Woodal 1997, 147). “Numerous complaints from 
these cases have alleged that Japanese standards serve to protect the interests of cartelized 
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industries or well-entrenched primary producer lobbies. Although, these „protective 
standards‟ are often justified on economic grounds, for instance employment for 
declining industries, most of the time their true rationale is political (153-154).”  
Moreover, public procurement has also been restrained to products which are in 
conformity with Japanese national standards and carry the mark for Japanese standards 
(Gabel 1987, 32). In so far as, the Industrial Standard Law required all the government 
institutions to purchase goods conforming to the Japanese national standards and carried 
the JIS (Japanese Industrial Standard) mark, if such goods were available. Only goods 
produced in Japan, however, could be tested and certified to conform to a JIS standard 
and carry the JIS mark. Even goods produced by Japanese owned firms overseas could 
not bear the JIS mark. Consequently, the government institutions were prevented by law 
from purchasing foreign goods if equivalent Japanese goods were available and carried 
the JIS mark. 
The success of these protective policies might have stemmed from the lack of 
interest from foreign companies in Japan‟s domestic market.  According to Mclntyre 
(1997, 158): “as long as foreign firms, particularly American companies, displayed little 
interest in penetrating in the Japanese market, it was relatively easy to employ standards 
that rigged domestic markets to favor selected firms and prohibited foreign competitors 
from snatching a significant market share in strategic industries and sectors.” 
However, Japan faced strong reactions in the international arena for its efforts to 
protect its domestic market through non-tariff barriers to trade, particularly national 
standards. During the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) negotiations in the mid 1970s, standards and national standards systems (non-
tariff barriers to trade) were highlighted as a major form of non-tariff barrier to trade. The 
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standards system in Japan came under harsh criticism as a major non-tariff barrier, 
particularly the relationship of Japanese standards specifications to standards, and the 
conformity assessment procedures for foreign products. In the 1980s' certain Japanese 
standards started to be seen as none of the key examples of the devices by which the 
Japanese government and industry act to close the economy to foreign products (Lecraw 
1987, 29-30).  
Japan has not limited the use of standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade to protect 
its domestic market, but it has also sought to establish international standards in high 
technology sectors. These two policy goals have tended to go hand in hand.  As examined 
in the following chapters, China is not the inventor or the forerunner of these strategies in 
East Asia.  
High Definition Television (HDTV) 
In the early 1970s, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) started a research 
on a studio standard of High Definition Television (HDTV). Besides this production and 
studio standard, NHK demonstrated a transmission system called MUSE. Japanese 
producers were also reported to conduct extensive research on set production. The 
arguments for and aim of the HDTV are significant improvement of picture quality, the 
establishment of a new service genre, instead of an enhanced TV system and the creation 
of software for the 21st century (Beuer and Pelkmans 1987, 200). The true motives, 
however, according to Beuer and Pelkmans (1987, 200) may well be strategic: 
“Conversion between HDTV/60 Hz and HDTV/50 Hz would not be desirable to NHK as 
it would imply more than one HDTV studio standard and a deterioration of the picture 
quality. In comparing the MUSE system with MAC, the NHK reached the contestable 
conclusion that MUSE shows better results for both still and moving pictures.” The 
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Japanese seem to have used a liberal but carefully planned patent and licensing policy 
(203). 
The Japanese planners were behind the scene for the HDTV standard initiative in 
every stage of the process. Grindley (1995, 195) has stressed the importance of the 
powerful strategy planned and followed by the Japanese developers for the global 
dominance of the HDTV market; they first established a domestic consensus between 
manufacturers and the state broadcaster, and introduced the global standard in stages for 
program production then transmission.  
The project was coordinated by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). They worked to ensure consensus between manufacturers, supported 
basic research and ensured that bank funding was available. The NHK developed the 
standard and the basic circuitry, and manufacturers such as Sony began developing 
compatible products. The basic NHK patents were made openly available to the sector. 
The system was demonstrated in Japan in 1980 and in the US in 1981. More importantly, 
in 1988, during the Seoul Olympic Games, live public demonstrations of satellite 
transmissions were made across Japan. The Japanese planned to benefit from the sale of 
the electronic products which are compatible with the standard, as the key patents were 
likely to be on the equipment developed by the manufacturers around the standard, and 
these are unlikely to be freely accessible (Grindley 1995, 203). 
  However, this strategy would fail against the US standard which was the 
outcome of an unusual standard setting procedure, combining market and official 
processes. According to Grindley (1995, 195), eventually American policy would lead to 
an advanced digital system to become the global standard: “The Japanese strategies came 
near to success in introducing Hi-Vision standard, and probably would have succeeded 
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had the technical and economic performance of the system been more favorable.” 
Grindley (1995, 195) has also attributed the failure of the Japanese standard to premature 
standardization through concentration on the mechanics of consensus, at the expense of 
allowing market demand to express itself. The Japanese strategy was effective in 
deciding a standard, but was not fully in touch with demand, and even in Japan the 
system has been regarded as outmoded and expensive. In addition, the consensus was too 
nationally oriented (196-197). 
Failure of the Japanese developers to develop a global HDTV standard also shows 
the limits of government led national standardization efforts. Japan seems not to have 
given serious thought to the demands of the consumers in development of the standard. 
Despite the powerful coalition building strategies of the Japanese, the US‟s market driven 
approach has proved itself as a reliable strategy to establish global standards in this case.  
Grindley (1995, 196-197) has argued that the centrally orchestrated policies in 
Japan and Europe may have been less effective than the hybrid policy used in the US, 
combining market and official processes. The Japanese model of administrated guidance 
effectively ensured consensus but they chose a conventional and apparently low risk 
technology, unappealing to users, although many elements of the Japanese strategy are 
valid. They, for instance, have established de facto standards for studio equipment, to 
succeed in a major share of the consumer market whatever transmission standard is 
chosen.  
Video Home System (VHS) 
In contrast to Japan‟s failure with the HDTV standard, Japan has witnessed 
another significant Japanese standard initiative exemplified by the competition between 
Betamax and VHS systems. This time, the Japanese planners at the MITI let Sony and 
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Japan Victor Corporation (JVC) compete for the market dominance of their standards. 
However, in 1976, they both lobbied the MITI to acquire government support, especially 
for export markets. Initially, the MITI supported Betamax, as it was the first standard that 
had been presented to the public and they did not want to confuse the market. However, 
as a result of the arguments of JVC and other manufacturers‟ support, including 
Matsushita, for the VHS, MITI decided to accept both standards and left the market to 
sort out the contest. Although, Sony's Betamax system has been generally accepted to be 
technically superior to the Betamax (Grindley 1995, 75), JVC conquered the market with 
its „educational' marketing strategy. Its market share in Japan rose from 40 per cent in 
1977, to 67 per cent in 1980, and to 93 percent in 1987. Acceptance of the VHS standard 
across the world would bring down product prices, most visibly in the US (84). 
Foreign Technology Acquisition 
In comparing China with Japan in foreign technology acquiring policies, Japan 
stands out to have preferred licensing foreign technology rather than allowing foreign 
investment (Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining 
China„s Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars 2006, 60). In addition, the MITI 
involved actively in negotiations between Japanese and foreign companies to reduce the 
licensing costs for Japanese companies. Japan„s preference for licensing foreign 
technology may have stemmed from Japan„s growing interest in foreign markets where 
Japanese firms may face patent infringement law suits and the fact that Japanese 
government lacked negotiation advantage vis-à-vis foreign companies due to their 
insignificant involvement in the Japanese market.  
However, Japan, for a long time, used its domestic market as a carrot to the 
foreign companies to extract foreign technology for its companies through joint ventures 
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whose terms and conditions were checked and controlled by the MITI. In comparing 
Japan with China in terms of their market size, University of Texas at Austin Professor 
Kenneth Flamm (pers. comm., 2/08/2011) highlighted the attractiveness of the large 
Japanese market, which is almost half of the US economy, for foreign companies.  
Besides being an important tool as a non-tariff protective measure, another 
important historical motivation for Japan‟s home-made standards is that Japan has also 
used these standards initiatives as one of the methods it has employed to acquire and 
disseminate foreign technology. 
The role played by the MITI for entry of foreign technologies in Japan stands out 
as another key factor in Japan‟s strategic technology acquisition policies. Beginning in 
1950, MITI was given authority to approve or reject all contracts for technology with 
foreign companies, owing largely to the scarcity of foreign exchange by Japan. With its 
control over approval of direct investment in Japan by foreign companies and a licensing 
system for imports, MITI controlled the terms on which Japanese electronics companies 
could acquire foreign technology. Most noteworthy, compared to China‟s recent 
strategies of market access for technology transfer as examined in the next chapters, is 
the MITI‟s efforts to force foreign companies to transfer or license their technologies to 
Japanese enterprises in exchange for market access (Flamm 1995, 44). 
MITI exercised tight controls over licensing, royalty, and technology transfer 
agreements, to influence the pricing and composition of technology imports and the 
structure of high-technology industries in Japan (55). MITI would allow only a limited 
number of foreign companies to invest in Japan, only through joint ventures with 
Japanese partners and in exchange for technology transfer. For instance, through 1963 
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only seven foreign semiconductor producers had been permitted to invest in the Japanese 
market, in all the cases extensive transfer of technology was a part of the deal (57). 
In addition, Japanese planners in MITI tended to closely monitor the deals 
between Japanese and foreign companies and allowed restricted market access only in 
exchange for extensive technology transfer to Japanese producers. MITI orchestrated, for 
instance, the negotiations behind the scenes between Sony and Texas Instruments. 
According to the agreement, Texas Instruments would only be allowed to enter the 
Japanese market, only in exchange for accepting a 3.5 per cent royalty rate for all the 
Japanese semiconductor makers for its patents, under continuing pressure from MITI 
(70). And, again, in the early 1960s, and again in the late 1960s and early 1970s, initially 
successful attempts by foreign chip producers to enter the Japanese market were blocked 
and parried by the government at the request of the domestic industry (124). 
South Korea 
In East Asia, South Korea has been one of the few industrialized countries that try 
to develop its home-made standards. The South Korean Government has launched an 
initiative to create a home-made standard for Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
technologies for the economy with close corporation with these companies. In fact, the 
government played an important role in the development and commercialization of 
CDMA technologies by working closely and neutrally with all industry partners. In 1993, 
the government set up a research fund for the development and implementation of 
CDMA technologies. It was financed from the funds obtained from the license fees of 
five CDMA operators and managed by the Institute of Information Technology 
Assessment whose board consists mainly of executives from operators. The government 
also arranged collaboration among government institutions and manufacturers from the 
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beginning to minimize the time lag between the technology development and 
commercialization. Five Korean companies, Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, 
Hyundai Electronics and Maxon, along with KT and ETRI established a research 
consortium, in collaboration with Qualcomm to develop, design, implement and field-test 
main components of the network infrastructure and terminals in 1989. However, for the 
South Korean companies and ETRI, Qualcomm provided an opportunity to gain access to 
mobile technology. Meanwhile, foreign manufacturers did not participate in this 
consortium because they primarily focused on the growing GSM market in Europe and 
the East Asia and worked on the next phase of services for the US (Lyytinen, Yang and 
Yoo 2005, 337). 
The limited numbers of major companies dominating the domestic market and 
operating in the South Korean economy, which also have close ties with the government, 
seem to have helped South Korea in its efforts to launch and develop this standard 
initiative. In addition, the main goal of the South Korean policy makers appear to create a 
royalty free technology environment for the South Korean companies rather than 
establishing a global standard and benefiting from it. Given the size of the South Korean 
economy, this policy is understandable.  
Taiwan 
Taiwan provides an example to the Chinese policy makers for foreign technology 
acquirement and dissemination. However, Taiwan has not launched any home-made 
standard initiative, owing probably to the small size of its economy. Taiwan, however, 
has showed distinct policies and strategies to acquire foreign technology. 
 According to Dadgson, Kastelle and Mathews (2006, 92), research consortiums 
have emerged as an innovative form of research and development collaboration in East 
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Asia, particularly in Taiwan. The role of research consortiums which function as patent 
pools continues to evolve in Taiwan. 
Government supported technological and scientific research institutes acting as 
innovation intermediaries have been indispensable in Taiwan‟s industrial development 
based on high technology. For instance, the Taiwan New Personal Computer (TNPC) 
Alliance formed in 1993, as of 2006, involved 31 partners including IBM, Apple and 
Motorola (91). According to an article of Mathews and Poon, which was published in the 
74(6) issue of the Journal of Industry of Free China in 2005 (cited in Dadgson, Kastelle 
and Mathews 2006, 91), the alliance has brought together companies from all branches of 
the information technology industry with a clear focus on transferring, up-taking and 
diffusing the new PowerPC technology in a series of products spanning PCs, software, 
peripherals and applications such as multimedia. This consortium seems also to have 
played an important role in negotiations with the American partner company and the 
diffusion of the foreign technology. 
 In addition, it is noteworthy that Taiwanese government has closely scrutinized 
license agreements between Taiwanese and foreign companies, and it has not hesitated to 
intervene in these deals within the framework of its IPR strategies. For instance, in the 
late 1990s, Philips licensed its pooled patents in a set package to Taiwanese CD 
manufacturers. One of the major Taiwanese companies, Gigastorage and other Taiwanese 
manufactures stopped paying royalties to Philips in 1999 and filed a complaint with 
Taiwan's Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) against Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden. The 
Taiwanese CD manufactures alleged that: “the patentees violated the Fair Trade Act 
because through their patent pool they had a monopoly on the CD-R market, abused that 
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monopoly power by demanding allegedly excessive royalties, colluded with each other to 
set prices, and tied non-essential patents to essential patents”  (Lim 2006). 
The TFTC ordered the patentees to allow prospective licensees the option of 
licensing individual patents rather than a package of patents and imposed fines totaling 
about NT$14 million (US$437,000). In addition, on appeal of Philips, the Taiwan Higher 
Court concluded that: “the patentees had improperly used their monopoly power on CD-
R technology to fix prices. In addition, the patentees abused their monopoly power by 
requiring licensees to withdraw any challenges to the validity of the patents to be 
licensed.” While the cases regarding an alleged violation of Taiwan's Fair Trade Act were 
pending, Taiwan's Intellectual Property Office concluded, in response to Gigastorage 
application for a compulsory license for Philip‟s patents that: “while Philips had 
committed unfair competition, its basis for issuing a compulsory license was not based 
upon that violation. Instead, the basis for the grant was that Gigastorage met the 
Taiwanese Patent Law's requirement that it could not reach an agreement with Philips for 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions after a considerable time period” (Lim 
2006). 
In addition, the Flat Panel Display (FPD) industry is another example of 
government led research and development collaboration efforts in Taiwan. In the 1990s, 
as the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) sponsored various research 
programs in TFT–LCD technology, the institute acquired several patents to pave the way 
for Taiwanese firms‟ entry into this high technology industry. However, when Taiwanese 
firms entered the industry, they allegedly faced „patent attacks‟ from established firms, 
demanding royalties for patent infringements. At this critical moment, ITRI formed the 
Taiwan TFT–LCD Association (TTLA) and transferred 232 patents to the association, to 
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provide a collective defense in the event of patent attack. The Association compromised 
of six Taiwanese firms; AU Optronics, Chi Mei Optoelectronics, Chung Hwa Picture 
Tubes, Hannstar Display, Quanta Display, Toppoly Optoelectronics, Prime View 
International and ERSO. TTLA was basically a patent pool and was modeled on the 
MPEG Association which licenses streaming video technology (Dadgson, Kastelle and 
Mathews 2006, 92). 
From the observation of these alliances, the overall inference is that the main 
purpose of the Taiwanese industry alliances appears to be negotiating with foreign, 
particularly the US technology companies as a single consortium instead of separate 
companies to license foreign technologies at reasonable costs and eliminate barriers to 
their entry into international markets. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In analyzing the transformation of China‟s strategies for the promotion of Chinese 
standards through the Indigenous Innovation Policies, it is clear that it is the international 
reactions and pressures that have directed some of China‟s strategies and retreats. But, 
one key element that needs to be taken into account when studying Chinese standards 
initiatives is the international law underlying these cases within the scope of China‟s 
WTO membership. But, which international agreements concern China most in its 
strategy change?  
According to Qingjiang (2009, 752), two international events have been a rude 
awakening for China. First one is the Uruguay Round which included IPR for the first 
time in the history of the multilateral trading system. The second is the United States‟ 
forceful and constant exertion of pressure on China to institutionalize an IPR regime of a 
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higher standard of protection. These two events have highlighted the importance of IPR 
in the eyes of China. 
WTO membership opened a new era for China. Even before its WTO 
membership, enforcement of counter measures by the US against China‟s international 
trade practices or weak IP protection regime, under the Article 301 provisions of the US 
law apparently convinced China of the need for an international framework for 
legitimacy of its actions.  In fact, China‟s 301 journey began in 1991 when it was 
declared to be a „Priority Foreign Country‟ by the US government. Failures in providing 
adequate and patent copyright protection for US products in its market, especially for 
computer software programs, were listed as the reasons for putting China in this list 
(Dinwoodie, et al. 2008, 711). 
In January 1995, the WTO was built upon the legacy of GATT. With the 
establishment of the WTO, countries have found a new platform to discuss and negotiate 
over non-tariff barriers and IPR disputes. Non-tariff barriers are called „the crucial terrain 
of trade policy today,‟ becoming „significantly more important‟ as the old line trade 
barriers of tariffs and quotas have been substantially reduced under more than four 
decades of the GATT regime (Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 47-49). 
The TBT Agreement 
In analyzing Chinese standards initiatives, one important international trade 
agreement that needs to be taken into account is the TBT Agreement. It has a special 
place to understand the trade regime through which China has sought its way for its 
standards initiatives.  
Although, the WTO incorporates a package of multilateral agreements which 
respond to the increasingly complex devices, such as non-tariff barriers, that can be used 
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to protect domestic interests and inhibit competition from imports, the non-tariff barriers 
to international trade had already came into the fore during the Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations in 1970s.  
Gibson (2007, 47-49) has summarized the history of international negotiations 
over non-tariff barriers before the enactment of the TBT Agreement as follows: 
The negotiations for reducing NTBs were complex, and the Round resulted in nine 
different special agreements on non-tariff measures, which were called ―codes‖ because 
they involved reasonably concrete obligations. Among these limited membership codes, 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, signed in April 1979 (the ―Standards 
Code‖), proved to be one of the most successful, with 47 governments eventually signing 
it (more than any other code).  
The TBT Agreement has emerged from the Uruguay Round. Unlike its 
predecessor the Standards Code for non-tariff barriers, it is fully integrated into the WTO 
system, as its provisions are binding for all the WTO members and any infringement of 
these rules would be governed by the WTO‟s dispute settlement mechanism. The broad 
purposes of the TBT Agreement are set forth in its preamble; encouraging international 
standards and conformity assessment systems, to improve the efficiency of production 
and facilitate the conduct of international trade, and ensuring that technical regulations, 
standards and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and 
standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade (Gibson, Paper 43 
2007, 47-49). 
However, the TBT Agreement does not have any provision addressing the IPR 
incorporated in international standards.  
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The TRIPS Agreement 
On the other hand, in analyzing Chinese initiatives, the other important 
international trade agreement that needs to be taken into account is the TRIPS 
Agreement. The Uruguay Round negotiations would be extended and ultimately led to 
the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. According to some observers the new 
agreement has given the developed countries what they had sought from developing 
countries with regard to IPR. This agreement indicates that the international patent law 
and policy have become ever more important in global economic development 
(Dinwoodie, et al. 2008, 446-447). 
The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO which was held in Doha, Qatar, in 
November 2001. This conference became known as the „Doha Development Agenda‟ as 
expressed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. That separate declaration seems to have 
provided developing countries a legal basis to overcome the rigidity of the international 
IPR regime. For our purposes in this study, Paragraph 37 of this declaration is significant: 
We agree to an examination, in a Working Group under the auspices of the 
General Council, of the relationship between trade and transfer of technology, and of any 
possible recommendations on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to 
increase flows of technology to developing countries. The General Council shall report to 
the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on progress in the examination. (World 
Trade Organization 2001)  
That separate declaration has called upon the members to examine ways to 
liberalize the compulsory licensing provisions of Article 31 the TRIPS Agreement. Two 
years later, the decision of the WTO General Council at the Fifth Ministerial Conference 
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in Cancun in 2003 would also implement changes in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement on an interim basis (Dinwoodie, et al. 2008, 446-447). 
China’s WTO Commitments 
TWTO members formally approved China‟s accession to the WTO in November 
2001 and China became the WTO‟s 143rd member on December 11, 2001. Prior to 
China‟s accession to the WTO, China and other WTO members negotiated bilaterally 
concerning China‟s market access commitments and concessions. In addition, the WTO 
Working Group Party (composed of all WTO members) engaged in multilateral 
negotiations with China concerning the rules that would govern trade with China. These 
commitments are set forth in China‟s Protocol of Accession and in an accompanying 
Report of the Working Party (Working Party Report). It is noteworthy that the Working 
Party Report has a number of the key commitments by China concerning Chinese 
standards. According to the record of this report, delegates from member countries raised 
questions about the opportunity for public consultation and commented on proposed 
Chinese standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures (Gibson, 
Paper 43 2007, 51). 
China agreed and confirmed, upon accession; to amend its procedures to clearly 
indicate minimum time frames for allowing public comment and to let comments be 
given due consideration regardless of origin; to accept the TBT Agreement‟s Code of 
Good Practice; to follow a clear policy to periodically review existing standards to 
harmonize them with relevant international standards where appropriate, and to bring all 
technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures into conformity 
with the TBT Agreement (51-52). 
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China also pledged to give up the system of separate safety certification standards 
for domestic and imported products (the „Great Wall‟ and „CCIB‟ marks, respectively) in 
favor of the new unified „CCC‟ standard. It also agreed to reorganize and merge its 
standards bureaucracy (Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 24-25). 
As regards China‟s standards initiatives and the rhetoric surrounding them, a 
review of the final accession protocol suggests that China does not have specific 
responsibilities to use international standards, but only that China will comply with the 
TBT Agreement. The Protocol is also silent on whether China is entitled to recourse as a 
developing country (Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 53). However, many member countries have 
expected China to try to harmonize its national standards with international standards. As 
of 2006, China had 21,342 national standards, 9,381 were either international standards 
adopted as national standards or were derived from international standards, including 
4,917 ISO standards and 1,902 from the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
(Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 11). 
During negotiations, the Chinese representative reportedly said that: 
 China‘s active adoption of international standards as the basis for technical 
regulations was a basic policy for accelerating its industrial modernization and 
promoting economic growth… To eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade, China would 
not maintain multiple or duplicative conformity assessment procedures, nor would it 
impose requirements exclusively on imported products. (quoted in Gibson, Paper 43 
2007, 51-53) 
In addition, in the accession protocol, China has made the following statement: 
China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner 
all its laws, regulations and other measures of the central government as well as local 
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regulations, rules and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level 
(collectively referred to as ―laws, regulations and other measures‖) pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(―TRIPS‖) or the control of foreign exchange. (Dinwoodie, et al. 2008, 726)  
In addition, a report by the U.S. - China Business Council (2010, 16) has verified 
that China has also agreed to accord national treatment for testing and certification bodies 
by opening technical testing and analysis services to foreign service providers that meet 
specific administrative, capital, and other requirements, and promised to permit qualified 
foreign companies to establish wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries by 2005. According to 
the same report, however, foreign companies in this field continue to face barriers to 
certifying products for sale in China. And, standards and conformity assessment have 
remained as a key concern for many foreign companies. Many of the council‟s member 
companies report limits on their ability to participate adequately in China's standards and 
conformity and conformity assessment system, with just 20 per cent of respondents 
describe their ability to participate as „good.‟ 
HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES IN CHINA 
This section examines the history of events and policies surrounding the 
Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper which was officially released in 2006. The 
indigenous innovation policies were launched after China‟s WTO membership and reflect 
the change in the Chinese strategies and trends in technology and innovation policies. To 
provide a more thorough historical account of the examined cases, this policy paper is 
discussed in the following chapter about the WAPI. 
China‟s statist ideological legacy from the cold war era under the influence of the 
Soviets seems to have played an important role in the formation of China‟s attitude 
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towards technological sufficiency for China.  From the very beginning, the main goal of 
the Chinese technology policies was to acquire foreign technology either through Soviets 
or Western countries in an effort for self-sufficiency in defense and rapid industrial 
growth in strategic technologies.  
In this era, Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) was reorganized in the model of 
the Soviet Academy of Science. The Soviet Union sent over 11,000 scientists and 
technicians to China, while China sent nearly 40,000 students to the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets also provided substantial technology transfer to Chinese science and research 
institutions, while Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bureaucrats took charge of all them.  
The Chinese government focused also its efforts on mega projects to create an 
industrialized economy as fast as possible. In 1956, the first national science and 
technology plan was developed by the CAS, with Soviet oversight. The 12 year plan 
listed 582 research projects, including „the two bombs and a satellite plan‟ that laid the 
groundwork for China‟s 1964 atomic bomb, 1967 hydrogen bomb and 1970 „East is Red‟ 
satellite. It is also noteworthy that, in all these projects the US educated Chinese scientists 
were key contributors. Chinese scientists, who returned from the US, after 1949 to build 
the new China, or escaped McCarthyism in the US, were key players in the science and 
technology accomplishments of the era (Macgregor, China„s Drive for Indigenous 
Innovation„ - A Web of Industrial Policies. n.d., 8).  
A review of the history of Chinese science and technology policies suggests that 
the roots of the Chinese mentality about the country‟s need to acquire or develop vital 
technologies for national sovereignty lay in this period.  Richard P. Suttmeier has argued 
from his comparative analysis of the Chinese and Japanese electronics industries over a 
40 year period that: “many of the Chinese advances occurred in almost exclusively 
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military and strategic programs. These programs showed no economically beneficial 
diffusion into nonstrategic or civilian arenas and actually hindered the industry‟s wider 
development” (Goth 2005, 85). 
The ideological emphasis on technology as the key to China‟s national 
sovereignty has continued even after the opening of the country to the global economy in 
1978. This new era has witnessed changes in Chinese technology policies without 
necessarily changing the mainstream policy objectives. In March 1978, the State Science 
Commission organized the National Science Conference with 6, 000 delegates, to draft a 
new plan for China‟s science policy to serve as a driver for China. This plan was 
developed by almost 20,000 experts from different fields, focusing on 27 research areas 
and 108 key research projects. Eight large projects were also in the plan in the fields of 
agriculture, energy, materials, electronic computers, lasers, space science, high-energy 
physics and genetic engineering (Macgregor, China„s Drive for Indigenous Innovation„ - 
A Web of Industrial Policies. n.d., 8).  
Since the day Deng Xiaoping unveiled science and technology as one of China‘s 
‗Four Modernizations‘ science policy has been in the direct hands of the country‘s top 
leaders, far beyond anywhere else in the world. Formal responsibility was placed in the 
premier‘s hands in 1983 with the creation of a ‗leading group‘ for science and 
technology, a structure the Party employs for its most crucial initiatives. Throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s, science and technology system reforms and new programs went 
into fast-forward. At the same time, Chinese diplomats scrambled around the world 
signing S&T cooperation agreements with nearly 100 countries. Thousands of Chinese 
scientists took up posts in nearly every major international science organization. 
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(Macgregor, China„s Drive for Indigenous Innovation„ - A Web of Industrial Policies. 
n.d., 8) 
According to Suttmeier and Xiangkui (2004, 13), the new Chinese technology 
policy strategies have involved a series of measures to exploit resources available from 
the international environment including; sending of large numbers of students and 
scholars abroad for advanced training, the purchase of vast amounts of foreign 
technology, the development of a foreign investment regime intended to acquire 
technology from by foreign firms operating in China, the use of financial and consulting 
services from abroad, and the signing of a large number of agreements with foreign 
governments for scientific and technological cooperation. 
They have also concluded from their study that the Chinese government‟s 
interactions with the international community afforded the policy makers numerous 
opportunities for learning, not only about technology, but also about policies, institutional 
designs, and managerial practices to reform the Chinese innovation system. “These 
opportunities were seized by Chinese policy makers and policy analysts, both to 
benchmark China‟s progress and to graft successful foreign practices on to Chinese 
realities” (Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 13). 
On the other hand, during the opening of the Chinese economy, patent rights have 
been strengthened. Before 1985, China only had a Management System of Science and 
Technology outcome, which presumably belonged to the entire country. According to 
China‟s first Patent Law, individuals could not apply for patents for inventions relating to 
their jobs, using materials from work, or within one year of leaving that job. Furthermore, 
without the permission of the government, government enterprises could not file patent 
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applications autonomously. Despite the reform of the system, however, for a long time, 
some sectors have been excluded from patent protection (Liang and Xue 2010, 475).  
According to Liang and Xue (2010, 475), the pattern of the development of IP 
rights reflects the Chinese authorities‟ intention to balance between stimulating 
indigenous innovations and attracting foreign technology by enforcement of patent 
protection.  
As a matter of fact, one important factor that paved the way for the release of the 
Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper in 2006 is China‟s efforts to develop the electronic 
sector and the dependence on foreign companies for IPR to support this critical sector. 
The SVCD (Super VCD) and EVD (Enhanced Versatile Disc) standards initiatives to 
replace CVD (China Video Disc) and DVD technologies respectively, by the Chinese 
policy makers are worth mentioning in this sense. In fact, in a number of industries, 
including electronics, Chinese firms were complaining about paying substantial license 
fees for the foreign technology, forcing Chinese producers to operate on thin profit 
margins. However, “the Japanese suppliers of knowhow and components, in comparison, 
are able to enjoy considerably larger margins by virtue of their control over the IP and 
standards” (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 10-11). 
In a noteworthy case, in September 1997, China's Ministry of Electronics Industry 
(MEI) announced its plans for Chinese extensions to the VideoCD 2.0 standard that 
would add internet connectivity and other interactive features. The three leading suppliers 
to the market were all US-based; C-Cube Microsystems (which claimed almost 70% of 
the market in 1997), ESS Technology, and Oak Technology. According to Linden (2003, 
7), these companies were central to the effort to launch an updated standard, as holders of 
essential technologies. In cooperation with these corporations, the Chinese government 
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launched a home-made standard initiative to develop a Chinese standard that would differ 
significantly from internationally accepted standards. The primary goal was apparently to 
acquire intellectual property that could be used to reduce royalty payments either directly 
or through use as a bargaining chip in royalty negotiations. A secondary goal may have 
been to favor Chinese companies over foreign competitors through the use of Chinese 
standards a non-tariff barrier. The Chinese government began collecting and pooling 
patents from its own agencies, foreign and domestic companies, universities and research 
institutes to incorporate necessary IP into the Chinese standards. Low profit margins in 
the electronic sector seem to have been the critical factor behind this initiative: 
While the government-sponsored standard was still under development, a 
competing VCD standard was floated by C-Cube Microsystems, backed by a coalition of 
Chinese VCD assemblers. CVD (for; China Video Disc), The field got even more 
crowded with a competing proposal, HQ-VCD, from the primary VCD patent holders and 
a fourth option from MEI‘s own working group. In June 1998, the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII, a super-ministry which had absorbed MEI) held an industry 
meeting to settle on a format, with the various proposals under consideration differing 
mainly in how close their screen resolution would come to the ultimate rival technology, 
DVD. At the time of the meeting, DVD component suppliers were rounding up support for 
the format among Chinese electronics producers, but DVD players would cost more than 
twice as much as VCD players – a high barrier in the price-conscious mainland market. 
(Linden 2003, 8)  
Eventually, MII would announce that HQ-VCD which incorporates patents owned 
by the major international electronics companies was chosen along with the inclusion of 
unspecified intellectual property from MII's internally developed format. In September 
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1998, the Chinese authorities announced the new standard, officially known as Super 
VCD (SVCD) (Linden 2003, 8). 
From his analyses of the Super VCD case Linden (2003, 8) has concluded that the 
VCD industry did not offer a very attractive target for policy intervention, having only a 
small market window before DVD players would become the dominant player, which 
would happen in the Chinese market in late 2002. However, VCD and SVCD players 
became, briefly, an important export item. In 1999, 6% of China‟s audio-visual exports 
were VCD players. Millions of units were exported primarily to other Asian countries. 
 




















14.30 million 300,000 
1999 
 
22.00 million 1 million 
2000 21.50 million 3 million 
 
Table 2: VCD and DVD Sales in China (All Brands and Models) (Linden 2003, 9). 
In the DVD sector, for instance, China accounted for more than 90% of world 
production in 2006 (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 10-11). However, entry into the DVD 
market was very costly from the Chinese perspective. The DVD case has strongly 
influenced the development of Chinese indigenous innovation policies.  The patent 
holders required license fees of $15 to $20 per player. In addition to two DVD patent 
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pools, additional license fees were also demanded by Thomson Multimedia, Dolby Labs 
and several other owners of compression and copy protection technologies. Chinese 
companies have started to face the pressure of the patent holders, while China‟s WTO 
accession negotiations were still continuing. In 2002, the primary patent holders 
(Toshiba, Matsushita, JVC, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and Time Warner) negotiated a rate of 
about $4 per player and a second group of patent holders (Philips, Sony, and Pioneer) 
negotiated a rate of $5 per unit. Although the issue remained unresolved as of 2003, the 
value of the concession was estimated to be about $50 million. According to Linden, the 
royalty issue, which was largely undisputed in the case of VCD players, came to a head 
for DVD players because of the dominance of the Japanese market in the sector. 
“Whereas VCD players were mostly for internal Chinese consumption, exports of DVD 
players from China displaced higher-priced Japanese exports to the U.S. market. This 
helps explain why the patent holders ultimately settled for royalties on exported players 
only” (Linden 2003, 9-10). 
When discussing the EVD technology and the standard, Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 
have argued that, although EVD was designed to avoid the patent trap of DVD 
technology, Chinese developers could not break away from DVD patents. “EVD is not a 
break-through in key technology and doesn‟t fundamentally improve storage capacity of 
optical discs” (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 23). 
From an observation of the DVD case, the general inference is that IPR, creating 
obstacles to Chinese industry especially with the high royalty rates particularly in the 
electronics sector, have made indigenous technologies and relevant home-made standard 
initiatives more critical in the eyes of Chinese policy makers.   
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In 2004, the Standards Administration of China (SAC) issued a draft report 
stressing the reasons why it urgently needed to revamp the way it developed standards 
(cited in Slater 2009, 5). According to this report, China‟s standardization system needed 
to be modernized because of the lack of proper technical trade protection measures to 
prevent easy entry of foreign products into the Chinese market. Therefore, the Chinese 
government shall guide national standards and strengthen the ties between intellectual 
property rights and standards so as to improve the proportion of self-proprietary 
technologies in Chinese standards.  
When analyzing the Chinese initiatives to create home-made standards to avoid 
foreign patents, the impression is that Chinese have not confronted any international 
challenge in their domestic market.  However, it is also viable to claim that the obstacles 
facing the Chinese standards in the post-WTO era for China and the restrictions of the 
membership would pave the way for China‟s Indigenous Innovation Policy Report and 
policies, with a multiple new strategies. Before proceeding to the following chapters 
about two main standards initiatives WAPI and AVS, a closer look at the Illustration 1 
shall provide the time-line to see these initiatives‟ progress within the background of 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: The WAPI Case 
 
WAPI is the prime example of China‟s home-made technology standards 
initiatives. China seems to have benefited from learning the trajectory of this case, the 
standard‟s rejection by the international community. Through this, China has discovered 
the limits of its maneuvering space in its policy implementation. Moreover, the Chinese 
institutions have shown their learning and adaption capacity after the drawback of the 
WAPI standard. 
POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Royalty Payments to Foreign Technologies  
A review of the literature on China‟s indigenous innovation policies suggests that 
negotiations between China and the patent holders of the DVD standard is one of the 
underlying reasons for the WAPI and pawed the way for indigenous innovation polices. 
One can also easily see the traces of nationalist policies in this case, as discussed in the 
second chapter. According to Gibson (2007, 49-50)  China‟s drive to create homegrown 
standards is essentially an attempt to control the “technological terms of its participation 
in the global economy.”  
Disputes over the IPRs for the DVD standard and the government‟s response, the 
EVD standard, exemplify the policy objectives of the Chinese policy makers and has set 
the stage for the WAPI standard soon after.  
The main patent alliances and patent pools that hold the essential patents for the 
DVD industry are 6C, 4C, DTS and MPEG LA. Those bodies have charged license fees 
on Chinese companies, which account for almost 20% to 30% of the total product cost 
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and making the margin profit of each DVD less than 30 RMB (Liang and Xue 2010, 485-
486).  
In 2002, the 3C DVD Licensing Group, which comprises of multinational 
corporations such as Philips, Sony, and Pioneer, triggered a crisis with China over IPR. 
At that time, China produced roughly 70 per cent of home DVD players in the world 
market, over 30 million sets in 2002. According to many Chinese observers of this crisis, 
attitude of these multinational bodies have shown that they were employing an IPR 
strategy to corner the Chinese DVD manufacturers. Chinese manufacturers had no choice 
other than to develop their own patented technology to avoid increasing licensing fees. 
The Chinese government proceeded by developing its own format for video player 
products, EVD, to overcome the difficulties that Chinese manufacturers faced. The key 
point here is that it was only after the failed negotiations with the DVD patent holders 
that the government decided to support the EVD standard to reduce license fee payments 
and shake off dependence on foreign technologies in production (Qingjiang 2009, 756-
757).  
Beijing E-World Digital Technology Company, which comprise of government 
bodies and 10 domestic electronics manufacturers, has claimed that the new EVD format 
had five times the image quality of DVD movies and a higher computer data-storage 
capacity. However, new players compatible with EVD would be more expensive than the 
domestically produced DVD players (compared with US$85 for the average cost of a 
domestic DVD player) in China. Moreover, competitors outside China responded by 
developing similar high-capacity optical disc formats in order to promote the DVD 
technology. For example, Japanese electronics giants, Toshiba and NEC developed their 
next-generation DVD standard. This new standard would also be approved by the DVD 
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Forum, an international association of electronics makers and movie studios; just weeks 
after the release of the EVD standard. As a response to this counterstrategy, Chinese 
government agencies and the manufacturers that compromise the E-World Digital 
Technology Company started lobbying the Chinese government to make the EVD 
standard mandatory in China. Their purpose was to convince the multinational companies 
including the manufacturers and film distributors to adapt to this standard in order to be 
able to enter the Chinese market (Qingjiang 2009, 757). 
Suttmeier, Tan and Yao (2006, 30) have attributed the EVS initiative to the sense 
of Chinese manufacturers that they do not gain what they deserve: 
Motivations for initiating a new standard are closely linked to the sense that the 
‗relative gains‘ from becoming the ‗workshop of the world‘ are not to China‘s liking. 
Although benefiting in absolute terms from participation in international production 
networks, Chinese firms often feel that they are not getting a fair return because of 
excessive royalties on licensed technologies. Because the intellectual property that is 
incorporated into technical standards lies in the hands of foreign companies, license fees 
are thought to cut unacceptably deeply into the profits of Chinese firms. 
 A report by the National Bureau of Asian Research has also suggested that there 
are „complex motivations‟ behind China‟s standards strategies (cited in Suttmeier and 
Xiangkui 2004, 3). With respect to standards and the intellectual property belonging to 
foreign companies, the same report has provided an account of the Chinese perspective: 
[China‘s] participation in the global economy is largely defined by its role in 
international production networks established by others. These networks employ 
technical standards and technological architectures set by the multinational 
corporations, which are able to capture value from their control over standards and 
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intellectual property. Thus, while China‘s absolute gains have been significant, it 
remains more than a little dissatisfied with the relative gains it realizes in comparison 
with international technology leaders—often seeing itself, for instance, in a ‗patent trap‘ 
that requires it to pay substantial royalties to others out of the sales of its manufacturers.  
 Gibson (2007, 22) has also stressed to the feeling developed among Chinese 
authorities and manufacturers that companies in developed countries influence the 
international standard setting processes by hiding underlying patents into the standards, 
creating an “inappropriate convergence” between standards and IP rights.  
In April 2007, Yi Xiaozhum, the vice-minister of China‟s Ministry of Commerce 
stated that: “[d]elayed or inadequate IPR disclosure, stringent IPR licensing conditions 
and expensive licensing fees run counter to fair competition, hinder the promotion and 
application of new technologies, obstruct the normal operation of international trade and 
impede the harmonious development of global economy and society”. He also 
emphasized that “developing countries are worst hit by such problems which effectively 
hinders their greater participation in economic globalization.” The vice-minister 
concluded his speech by emphasizing the smooth implementation of the TBT Agreement: 
“attention should be given on the one hand to the efficiency and quality of setting 
international standards, and on the other hand to the difficulties members face in adopting 
international standards” (quoted in Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 22).  
In this context, China has embarked on developing an extensive research and 
innovation policy framework to increase its relative gains from participation to 
international economic system. These strategies have expanded to the building of a 
Chinese intellectual property portfolio and the incorporation of Chinese IP into Chinese-
developed standards (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 1). 
50 
 
The Chinese authorities have also proceeded to adapt to the WTO‟s international 
monitoring system and focused its efforts on IPR. For instance, in a noteworthy case, the 
Chinese News Web reported in December 10 of 2005 that Professor Zhang Ping, an IPR 
Professor at the Peking University issued an invalidation appeal for a patent owned by 
Philips, which was included in 4C patent pool as an essential patent for DVDs (quoted in 
Liang and Xue 2010, 489). He claimed that the patent did not meet the creativity and 
novelty requirements. By January 2006, another four famous scholars also joined him. At 
the end of one year‟s negotiations, Philips compromised with the plaintiffs by agreeing to 
withdraw the patent from the patent pool. However, this withdrawal alone would not 
suffice to reduce the royalty payment rate for the Chinese manufacturers. 
 Nevertheless, in most cases, the Chinese government has not announced 
officially approved industrial strategy papers that address these issues, even a casual 
observation of the various news sources and reports reveals that a certain strategy has 
been pursued. According to a report by the Bureau of Export Administration (1999, 21) 
China‟s industrial policy for the electronics industry (as well as for other key sectors) 
continuously updated in terms of investment, trade, and technology transfer provisions by 
the government as needed.  According to the same report, the policy of China‟s Ministry 
of Electronics Industry is not to “encourage technology transfers or establishment of joint 
ventures in China if out-of-date technologies are involved."  
Clearly, in order to increase its relative gains from participation to international 
economic system, China needs to acquire foreign technology. For instance, China‟s Five-
Year Plan (1996-2000) called specifically for development of advanced integrated 
circuits to achieve the 0.3 submicron level by 2000. Foreign capital and technological 
know-how is necessary for the development of this strategic sector to advance China's 
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domestic Integrated Circuits manufacturing capabilities and to meet the domestic demand 
that Chinese firms are currently not able to meet (The Bureau of Export Administration 
1999, 32). 
China’s Strategies  
China appears to have a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis foreign companies that 
own patents underlying those technologies to acquire foreign technology; the 
government‟s overall practice is to persuade foreign companies to transfer technology in 
exchange for market access. China uses its superior bargaining power to force foreign 
companies to accept unreasonably low royalties that are significantly below prevailing 
rates in other markets. These policies are declared to be inconsistent with the fundamental 
rights conferred by patent to technology owners and constitute an express violation, or at 
least nullification or impairment, of TRIPS patent provisions (United States Information 
Technology Office 2010, 12). 
Although, such technology transfer requirements are not spelled out in Chinese 
law. Most of the time, however, Chinese authorities and officials are allegedly 
unambiguous during negotiations with foreign companies that market access is available 
only in exchange for technology transfer. They also regularly attempt to play one foreign 
company against another. The lack of transparency also contributes to the ambiguity of 
the business climate (The Bureau of Export Administration 1999, 21). 
In the VCD players‟ case, for instance, China appears to have found a way to 
compensate Japanese and European companies (Matsushita, JVC, Sony and Philips) 
which owned the patents covering the VideoCD 1.0 and 2.0 standards in its domestic 
market. According to Linden (2003, 6) these royalty free standards contributed to the 
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affordability of Chinese VCD players. And, all these patent holding companies had large 
scale investments in China and agreed to compromise with the government. 
Reportedly, foreign  companies that have first developed their technologies 
outside China and have not found a way to circumvent regulations through establishing a 
joint venture with a local company or entering alliances with „differentially treated‟ 
domestic companies are excluded from the government procurement market in China 
(Lubman 2010). 
According to the Semiconductor Equipment & Materials International (SEMI) 
Group, joint venture approval, which is the only way for foreign companies to operate in 
most of the Chinese sectors, is often restricted to those companies that promise a certain 
level of technology transfer (The Bureau of Export Administration 1999, 32). Macgregor 
(Time to Rethink U.S.- China Trade Relations 2010) has contended that China is a „pay-
to-play‟ market for foreigners, with mandated joint ventures in key industries, local 
manufacturing requirements and forced technology transfers as the price of market 
admission: “The poster child is the evolving „indigenous innovation‟ policy, which 
appears aimed at using China's market power to coerce foreign companies to transfer and 
license their latest technology for „co-innovation‟ and „e-innovation‟ by Chinese 
companies.”  
 In addition, the Chinese authorities have been reported to impose restrictive 
policies upon economic actors to limit the royalty payments to foreign companies that 
own the patents in standards. In a recent legal case in which the plaintiff alleged 
infringement of its patent that had been incorporated into an industrial standard issued by 
the Ministry of Construction, the Supreme People„s Court concluded that: 
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If a patentee engages in the setting of a standard or agrees having the patent 
incorporated into a national, industrial or local standard, it would be deemed that the 
patentee permits others to exploit the patent while implementing the standard; others‘ 
such exploitation / implementation of the patent does not constitute patent infringement 
provided by Article 11 of the Patent Law. Patentee may ask the exploiter/implementer to 
pay a fee for use of the patent, but the amount of fee should be significantly lower than 
the normal license fee. In case that the patentee commits to give up the fee for such 
exploitation of the patent that commitment should be followed. (quoted in United States 
Information Technology Office 2010, 12)  
Protection of the Domestic Market 
As some aspects of the Japanese policies to use national standards as a non-tariff 
barrier to international trade are examined in the previous chapter, one of the 
explanations that I develop to account for China‟s home-made standards initiatives is to 
protect its domestic market from foreign competition. However, with the GATT and the 
establishment of the WTO, implementing non-tariff barriers to trade have become more 
difficult for within the international trade system. Hence, protection through mandatory 
national standards has become even harder to implement. Even though, the TBT 
Agreement has set the stage for the prohibition of mandatory national standards which 
are not in-conformity with international standards, as a matter of fact, it is still a viable 
option for the signatory countries to use national standards in public procurement or 
through government companies. However, even those national standards must depend on 
or be in conformity with relevant international standards, unless governments have a 
reasonable reason to do otherwise. 
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This is in part why; China has the motivation to use Chinese standards in its 
domestic market through the government‟s procurement activities or government 
corporations. It is possible to make national standards mandatory for public procurement 
as much as to exclude products that have not been produced with domestic technology. 
HISTORY OF WAPI 
In examining the China‟s policy approaches and strategies after the WTO 
membership, it is critically instructive to take into account China‟s experience with the 
WAPI. This chapter concludes that the change in strategies and the emphasis put on 
home-made standards initiatives reflect not only the WTO membership process of China 
and the requirements of international agreements, but also, the growing awareness and 
reactions of other countries against China, as exemplified by the WAPI. 
In 2003, a coalition of eight Chinese ministries announced that by June 1, 2004 all 
wireless devices sold in China must include support for a new Chinese home-grown 
standard (WAPI) for wireless local area networking (or WLAN). This new standard was 
developed for computers and other networking equipment in China for communicating 
with wireless hotspots, printers and other accessories. Despite the provisions of the TBT 
Agreement, China announced that this new mandatory standard for the Chinese market 
was necessary for security reasons to overcome the vulnerabilities of the international 
WLAN standard. New standard was promoted to resolve security loopholes in a protocol 
known as 802.11, or Wi-Fi, the global standard for wireless networking (Macgregor n.d., 
28).  
However, it suffered from a number of technical limitations. The government also 
made compliance with this new Chinese standard mandatory for many types electronic 
equipments such as Centrino notebooks and personal digital assistants and other devices, 
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irrespective of their origin, affecting a multibillion-dollar industry. What makes the 
WAPI standard more troubling for the foreigners is that foreign computer and chip 
makers were required to partner with one of the 24 Chinese companies to which the 
WAPI standard had been disclosed, if they want to continue their access to the Chinese 
market. The government provided these Chinese companies with the necessary 
algorithms. This may entail providing „technical product specifications‟, confidential 
designs and encryption technologies, to potential competitors if they want to market their 
products in China, and according to the United States Trade Representative, a clear 
violation of national treatment under the TBT provisions (Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 
27-28).  
Foreign companies have also raised their concerns that WAPI will force them to 
produce separate products for the Chinese and the global market.  These concerns would 
immediately escalate into a major trade dispute (Macgregor n.d., 29-30). 
By contrast, South Korea has provided its manufacturers with an alternative 
system that help them with the royalty requirement of the international standards. 
However, South Korea has not made the standard mandatory or imposed further 
restrictions on manufacturers. Although the installation of WIPI was mandated as the 
mobile platform standard in South Korea, mobile platform developers are still able to 
compete for better platforms if they satisfy the WIPI specifications (Lee and Oh 2008, 
669). 
International Criticism and Drawback 
The international reaction which triggered a major trade dispute, stemmed clearly 
from China‟s imposing of WAPI in place of internationally accepted standard Wi-Fi. In 
January 2004, the American Wi-Fi Alliance announced that: “it would support 
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suspending the sale of Wi-Fi chips to China if a compromise wasn‟t reached” (quoted in 
Macgregor n.d., 29). 
The US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that the WAPI 
encryption technology is “differing significantly from the internationally recognized 
standard that U.S. companies have adopted for global production” (quoted in Kennedy 
2006, 52).   
 
 
Illustration 2: The Relationship between WAPI and Other Protocols (Lee and Oh 
2008). 
Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans and Secretary of State Colin Powell 
criticized the WAPI on the grounds that:  
China would be the only country in the world mandating a specific encryption 
standard for general consumer use. Since this standard is unique to China, 
implementation will impose a significant new burden on both foreign and Chinese 
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domestic suppliers. Furthermore, implementation of this standard will make Chinese 
products incompatible with internationally-accepted standards, isolating China from the 
larger world market…. We are particularly concerned that the new rules would require 
foreign suppliers to enter into joint ventures with Chinese companies and transfer 
technology to them. Such compelled investment and technology transfer would appear to 
be inconsistent with China's WTO commitments. (quoted in Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 34-
35). 
The high technology community in the United States, with the help of the 
Department of Commerce and the US Trade Representative reportedly made 
extraordinary efforts to reverse Chinese WAPI policy by using both formal ways and 
informal ways through enlisting Cabinet level political support to pressure Beijing to 
reconsider the Chinese position (Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards 
Coalitions: Explaining China„s Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars 2006, 52).  
Intel was one of the few companies that openly confronted the Chinese authorities 
for the WAPI, by not meeting China‟s June 1 deadline for adhering to WAPI (Flynn 
2004). Intel declared that „„after a considerable amount of analysis we have decided not 
to support WAPI or produce any product that supports WAPI. We have concerns about 
its deployment and performance and the quality of user experience.‟‟ The company 
argued that WAPI was more than a generation behind current technologies (Foremski 
2004). 
Most of the foreign companies maintained a united front in opposing the WAPI 
standard (Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 30), as exemplified by the president of the US 
Semiconductor Industry Association, George Scalise commenting that: “a unique Chinese 
national standard will slow the development of China‟s information technology industries 
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because it will hamper the ability of Chinese firms to access the innovations emerging 
from thousands of companies around the world” (quoted in Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 
30). 
Only a few foreign companies would begin trying to comply with the standard 
and collaborating with potential Chinese partners that have the encryption codes, 
including BenQ, D-Link, CyberTAN, Atheros, Netgear, Linksys, and Texas Instruments 
(Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China„s 
Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars 2006, 52). 
Confronting an international trade dispute, in 2004, the Chinese government 
announced to postpone WAPI‟s implementation, Vice-Premier Wu Yi announced that: 
“China would „indefinitely delay‟ WAPI enforcement” (quoted in Macgregor n.d., 29).  
However, despite the government‟s announcement of its pledge to suspend 
implementation of WAPI as a mandatory standard, it would declare in 2005 that products 
incorporating the WAPI standard would be given preference in government procurement 
(Trade Lawyers Advisory Group 2007, 21). It is noteworthy that this announcement came 
shortly before the release of the Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper. 
Despite the international criticism and the announcements of the International Wi-
Fi Alliance against the WAPI initiative, China proceeded one step further and sent WAPI 
for recognition by the ISO (Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 35-36). Some feared that China 
would try to promote WAPI as a global standard.  Many foreign companies, especially 
US chipmakers, asked for intervention from their governments, and the dispute would 
involve the US government. 
 Interestingly, some multi-national companies supported China in this process. 
Suttmeier and Yao (2004, 30) have reported that Texas Instruments (TI) indicated its 
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intention to support the WAPI standard, TI‟s general manager for Asia Cheng Tianzong 
said that: “it is reasonable for China to make its own standards in light of its national 
security concerns and that, furthermore, Texas Instruments needs the Chinese market and 
wants to cooperate with Chinese enterprises” (quoted in Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 
30).  In January 2005, according to China Business Daily News, Intel changed its initial 
position and announced that „„the company always supports open standards that are 
consistent with international ones, and supports the Chinese government in submitting the 
amended WAPI Standard proposal to ISO (quoted in Lee and Oh 2008, 666). 
An agreement was made between the US and China that WAPI would be 
reviewed by IEEE. According to this agreement, WAPI might have gone through the 
process of becoming an international standard. In November 2004, the WAPI standard 
was listed as a formal proposal along with the IEEE802.11i proposal at the annual 
ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee Subcommittee for „telecommunications and 
information exchange between systems‟ meeting. However, visas were denied for some 
of the Chinese delegates who would attend the meeting in the US. A follow-on session of 
ISO/ IEC JTC1 S6 was held in February 2005 in Frankfurt, Germany (Lee and Oh 2008, 
666). However, in February 2005, the Chinese delegation was reported to withdraw from 
the ISO meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, and to allege „unfair treatment‟ and that WAPI 
was blocked by „international monopoly forces.‟ In March 2006, the ISO rejected the 
proposed WAPI standard and instead, adopted the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers‟ (IEEE) 802.11i security specification (Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 35-36). 
“Xinhua news agency huffed that the rejection was the result of an „organized conspiracy 
against China” (Macgregor n.d., 29-30).  
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According to Yan (ISO Meeting Fails to Back WAPI Standard 2005), this 
international rejection and the events amount to a strategy against China‟s WAPI 
standard, perpetrated to make the Wi-Fi standard a de facto standard in the market during 
the extended time.  
The failure of the WAPI initiative appears to have stemmed from the power of the 
international coalition compromising of major multinational companies. WAPI was 
supported by a narrow coalition; SEMC and the BWIPS drafting group, led by 
IWNCOMM, and two dozen Chinese companies licensed to receive the WAPI algorithm, 
including Lenovo, Founder, Qinghua Tongfang, Huawei, and TCL.  These companies 
could either produce their own WAPI compatible products or cooperate with foreign 
technology companies. However, only a few reportedly had much enthusiasm for WAPI 
(Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions: Explaining China„s 
Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars 2006, 52). In addition, foreign firms were 
excluded from the standard setting in the WAPI case on the grounds of national security.  
The WAPI case showed strong political over tones which explain the closure of the 
WAPI organization to foreign firms, and WAPI‟s staying power may be explained by the 
influence of the security bureaucracy on Chinese policy. According to Lee and Oh (2008 
668), by closing itself to others, WAPI‟s support coalition would be destined to be 
narrow. 
In light of these observations, this is one of the important lessons that the Chinese 
authorities have learned from this international case. This point shall be continued to be 
examined in the AVS case in the fourth chapter.  
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ANALYZING THE WAPI CASE UNDER THE WTO 
In analyzing the transformation of the government strategies for the promotion of 
the WAPI standard through the Indigenous Innovation Policies, it is clear that it is the 
international reactions and pressures that made the Chinese government withdraw from 
its initial position. But, one key element that needs to be taken into account when 
studying the WAPI case and other standards initiatives is the international law underlying 
these cases within the scope of China‟s WTO membership. Two international agreements 
concern China most in its strategy change.  
From the Perspective of the TBT Agreement 
In this section, WAPI case is discussed with respect to the international law, 
particularly its mandatory nature, and disclosure of its encryption codes to only specific 
Chinese companies. However, these views presented in this section, analyze the case 
before opening of the encryption codes to foreign companies and lift of the obligations 
for mandatory acceptance of the standard. 
While, according to the TBT Agreement, where relevant international standards 
exist, members shall use them as a basis for their technical regulations except when such 
international standards are deemed to be ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued (TBT Agreement, Article 2.4.). This 
provision means that if an international standard exists, and that standard would be 
effective in accomplishing a government‟s legitimate regulatory objectives, the 
international standard must be used (Cromer 2005, 6). Yet, the TBT Committee rejects 
the creation of an exhaustive list of approved international standardizing bodies (Trade 
Lawyers Advisory Group 2007, 64). 
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However, in the WAPI case, Trade Lawyer‟s Advisory Group (2007, 64) has 
reported that China‟s formal definition of international standards is limited to those 
promulgated by the ISO, IEC, ITU and certain other international organizations approved 
by the ISO. The Advisory Group has criticized China for that: “this definition 
discriminates against both U.S.-based standards organizations that develop internationally 
accepted standards and the thousands of large and small U.S. manufacturers that use 
these standards in their products.”  
A review of the WTO Appellate Body decisions suggests that internationally 
accepted standards need not to be agreed by consensus. The Appellate Body in the EC – 
Sardines case, for instance, rejected the EC‟s argument that an international standard 
requires consensus. According to Cromer (2005, 7), China‟s lack of acceptance of the 
Wi-Fi standard would not change this. Hence, the test for whether a standard exists 
depends on whether a „recognized body‟ of the international standardization community 
adopted it, not on whether all parties agreed to such a standard. Wi-Fi is an international 
standard. Because an international standard exists, China is obligated to base its 
regulations on this standard unless Wi-Fi “would be an ineffective or inappropriate means 
for the fulfillment of legitimate objectives” (Cromer 2005, 7). 
Gibson (2007, 63) has also concluded that the 802.11 wireless standard is an 
international standard, as it has been approved by ISO as an international standard, and 
ISO is a „recognized body‟ within the sense used by the Appellate Body.  
Another key factor for examining the legality of the WAPI case is that the TBT 
imposes an additional obligation on Members to ensure that technical regulations shall 
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.  Hence, 
according to Cromer (2005, 7-8), the manner in which China chose to implement its 
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WAPI policy, requiring foreign manufacturers to negotiate licenses with a limited 
number of Chinese firms, is more trade-restrictive than necessary to accomplish its 
information security objective. Even if WAPI is necessary to protect China‟s legitimate 
objectives, the policy would probably still match the TBT criteria, as it is applied in a 
discriminatory manner. Only a limited number of domestic companies were given the 
encryption code of the WAPI standard, whereas foreign companies can gain access to it 
through these Chinese companies. The WAPI policy seemed to violate the National 
Treatment principle of the WTO, and “the exceptions do not excuse such discrimination” 
(10).  
A major finding of the analysis of the WAPI case done by Gibson (Gibson, Paper 
43 2007, 56-59) is that: “more narrowly tailored means could have been used to meet 
national security objectives, while minimizing the disruptive impact on trade in wireless 
products. China would have to justify such licensing practices as not more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill legitimate objectives.”  
However, according to the University of Texas at Austin Law Professor Patricia 
Hansen (pers. comm., 2/22/2011): „National Security Argument‟ is of self judging nature, 
as exemplified by the use of this argument by the US in the past. Given the international 
objection to the Helms-Burton Act, “[if other countries bring the case to the WTO 
Appellate Body] the US announced that it would not even show up in the panel.” 
Moreover, in examining the Helms-Burton Act for compliance with the WTO rules, 
Jackson and Lowenfeld (1997) wrote that: “very few GATT cases (and so far, no WTO 
cases) have addressed the meaning of Article XXI. There is some GATT practice 
supporting „auto-determination‟, but the only time a GATT panel has favored this 
approach, its view was constrained by particular „terms of reference‟ to the panel, which 
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are not today present in the case.”  In their view, China‟s „National Security Argument‟ is 
still open to questions, as no panel has addressed a similar issue and provided a proper 
explanation. 
The mandatory nature of WAPI, if it had been implemented as intended, would 
adversely affect the internal sale or use of foreign wireless equipment incorporating the 
international 802.11i standard.  According to Gibson (2007, 56): “any effort to prevent 
sale of equipment using the 802.11i standard while mandating WAPI could be viewed as 
a violation of the national treatment principle, found in both GATT III:4 and in Article 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement.”  
There is also an apparent similarity between the WAPI and WTO Shrimp Turtle 
cases. In the latter case, the WTO found a violation of the international law due to “the 
unilateral approach of the United States to impose a standard, rather than negotiate with 
its trade partners to find a solution to the problem of sea turtle conservation” (58).  
The WAPI standard was also criticized for violating the TBT Principles of 
openness and impartiality. For openness, these principles provide that international 
standardizing bodies should be open on a non-discriminatory basis to relevant bodies of 
all WTO members and that “meaningful opportunities to contribute to the elaboration of 
an international standard so that the standard development process will not give privilege 
to, or favor the interests of, a particular supplier/s, country/ies or region/s” (66). The 
concept of openness here involves participation at the policy development level and every 
other stage of standards development. And, Gibson (2007, 65-67) has concluded that 
China‟s closed approach for the WAPI does not match these criteria.  
China‟s call for change within the framework of the TBT Agreement, to address 
unfairness in international standard setting and more detailed rules governing IP in 
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connection with international standards is also noteworthy. These efforts might also 
reflect China‟s own acceptance of its being fault with international rules within the 
framework of the WTO (44-45). As, “there is no basis under WTO rules for asserting that 
IP issues, which China claims, have become an obstacle to trade, provide grounds for 
mandating a national WAPI regulation (particularly one developed in a closed and 
exclusionary process)” (59). 
Although, the Accession Protocol for China is silent about its „developing country 
status,‟ Chinese representatives, on many occasions, tend to use the argument that China 
is still a developing country and as a late-comer, has not participated in international 
standards setting activities adequately. However, against this argument, Gibson (2007, 
67) has contended that under the recent reforms of the WTO, the focus is on improving 
developing countries‟ participation in international activities, not granting them grounds 
to use discriminatory standard development processes at home.  
From the Perspective of the TRIPS Agreement 
Some of the views about the compliance of the WAPI standard with the 
provisions and principles of the TBT Agreement have been presented in the previous 
section; however, the TBT Agreement does not adequately satisfy the concerns of 
developing countries over IPR. The TRIPS Agreement, whereas, seems to address some 
of these concerns. 
The study conducted by Dinwoodie, et al. (2008, 449-450) has illustrated the 
potential provisions that arm developing countries with legal grounds for maintaining a 




Beyond traditional notions of ‗public interest‘ and ‗abuse‘, the TRIPS Agreement 
introduces new and more expansive concepts whose outer limits have yet to be delineated 
at the international level. In particular, article 7 stresses ‗the promotion of technological 
innovation and … the transfer and dissemination of technology … in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare‘ Article 8(1) expands potential public-interest exceptions 
to sectors other than public health and nutrition that are ‗of vital importance to … socio-
economic and technological base,‘ and it must be read in conjunction with the other 
provisions favoring this group of countries.  
Imposition of compulsory licenses within Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
article 5A of the Paris Convention can also be listed along these provisions. This 
interpretation of these provisions opens new possibilities for developing countries. 
However, the meaning of any particular clause must emerge from evolving state practice, 
and eventually, specific public-interest safeguards essential to national economic 
development will have to be worked out on a case-by case basis (Dinwoodie, et al. 2008, 
449-450). Within the general purpose of this study, in trying to assess the alleged 
violations of foreign IPR in China‟s home-made standards, the methods that developing 
countries can enforce lax IPR are crucial. Dinwoodie, et al. (2008, 448) have explored 
some of these possibilities: 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement declares that states should tolerate only 
‗limited exceptions to the exclusive rights‘ that article 28 confers. But other articles 
permit exceptions to the exclusive rights when needed ―to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance‖ to economic 
development; to prevent ‗abuse of intellectual property rights,‘ including the imposition 
of unreasonable commercial terms; and to counteract unreasonable trade restraints and 
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practices that ‗adversely affect the international transfer of technology.‘ Governments 
may also attempt to invoke language in article 7 that envisions the maintenance of social 
and economic welfare as further grounds for regulatory action limiting grants of 
exclusive rights in appropriate circumstances. These and other articles thus preserve, 
and may even expand, preexisting grounds for limiting a patentee‘s exclusive rights 
under 5A of the Paris Convention, which some developed country delegations had hoped 
to abrogate. 
However, China has not taken any formal measure to apply those provisions. In 
particular, to date, there has not been any published report of a compulsory license 
granted to practice a non-Chinese corporation's patent (Lim 2006).   
The critical point here is that the scope of use without authorization, under Article 
31 of the TRIPS Agreement, is limited to „public non-commercial use‟ and „supply of the 
domestic market‟ (Li and Baisheng 2009). Although, Article 5 of the Paris Convention 
and Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allow the granting of compulsory licensing, there 
are many limits on using it. According to Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, for 
instance, any compulsory licensing “shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use” (Zhan and Zhu 2007, 191). In 
addition,  “such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable 
period of time.” Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding between China and the 
US on the IPR (1992) also set many limits on using compulsory licensing. The 
application of compulsory licensing requires that they do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent (Li and Baisheng 2009, 28-29).  
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Despite the fact that China has not applied compulsory licensing under Article 31 
of the TRIPS Agreement for the IPR in the WAPI or other home-made standards 
initiatives, China might adhere to applying those provisions to foreign patents when the 
policy makers intend to promote the WAPI and other home-made standards in other 
narrow, complementary marketing segments. In such a case, given the weak IPR 
protection in the country, such an action would hardly surprise anyone.     
A decision by the Supreme People‟s Court of China (SPC) adjudicates a case in 
which the plaintiff alleged infringement of its patent that had been incorporated into an 
industrial standard issued by the Ministry of Construction. In that critical case, the SPC 
decided that:  
Whereas the standard-setting authorities in China have not established public 
disclosure and use rules of patent information in relevant standards, if a patentee 
engages in the setting of a standard or agrees having the patent incorporated into a 
national, industrial or local standard, it would be deemed that the patentee permits 
others to exploit the patent while implementing the standard; Others‘ such exploitation / 
implementation of the patent does not constitute patent infringement provided by Article 
11 of the Patent Law. Patentee may ask the exploiter/implementer to pay a fee for use of 
the patent, but the amount of fee should be significantly lower than the normal license 
fee. In case that the patentee commits to give up the fee for such exploitation of the 
patent, that commitment should be followed. (quoted in United States Information 
Technology Office, 2010, 12. 
As a last remark of this section, as regards China‟s decision in 2005 to use the 
WAPI standard for public procurement, or by government companies on a non-
mandatory basis; Gibson (2007, 65) has argued that still the international standard should 
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be used as a basis for the non-mandatory national standard, as stipulated by the TBT 
Agreement Code of Good Practice. Even if China uses the WAPI standard only for public 
procurement and government bodies, “China will need to explain why it did not use the 
802.11 standard as the basis for developing its own WAPI standard to address security 
deficiencies” (Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 65). 
From the review of the literature and the comments on the WAPI case, the overall 
impression is that the key factor that made China withdraw from its initial stand is not the 
fear that the case might be brought after the WTO Appellate Body. Rather, the 
international reaction and the criticism appear to have played a more important role in 
this decision. Yet, China has turned to the game with more flexible strategies to 
overcome any obstacle. 
THE INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICY PAPER AND THE CHANGE IN 
STRATEGIES 
The Provisional Measures for the Accreditation of National Indigenous Innovation 
Products 
China‟s technology policies, particularly policies concerning the WAPI initiative, 
have taken a new form and set new and more challenging goals in 2006 with the official 
declaration of the Indigenous Innovation Policy Report. 
When China became a member of the WTO, it was expected to harmonize its 
national standards with international standards and strengthen its IPR regime. By the end 
of 2004, China had 21,342 national standards, of which 3,045 were compulsory. 9,381 
standards had been either international standards adopted as national standards or had 
been derived from international standards, including 4,917 ISO standards and 1,902 IEC 
standards (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 13). 
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WTO membership would appear to be a threshold for China, as the country seems 
to have been bothered by several IPR issues, as examined in the DVD case. IPR have also 
become a major issue for the Chinese government institutions.  
China was expected to open its standards setting processes to foreign 
participation, in conformity with the WTO rules. However, in 2005, the Ministry of 
Information and Industry (MII) allowed foreign participation in Chinese standardization 
activities only on condition that those companies transfer their patents at minimal costs. 
However, only a few foreign companies chose to participate on those terms (Slater 2009, 
6). 
In this new era, Chinese authorities have also decided to bring IPR and 
international standards issues to the WTO, as they regard them as obstacles to the 
development of China‟s industrial and technological capacity. In mid 2005, China 
submitted a position paper to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, stating 
that: “IPR issues in preparing and adopting international standards have become an 
obstacle for Members to adopt international standards and facilitate international trade 
[and] WTO should explore appropriate trade policies to resolve difficulties arising from 
this issue.” A supplemental paper submitted in 2006 also has stated that: “for more rules 
to better balance the interests of patent holders and users as market forces allegedly do 
not resolve all of the problems encountered in standards development” (quoted in Slater 
2009, 6). According to Slater (2009, 6), these two WTO position papers were motivated 
in part by a desire to establish rules that would force the licensing of essential patents 
incorporated in international standards at more reasonable and predictable royalty rates. 
However, none of these efforts would succeed in changing the international standard 
setting framework that China has so long complained about. 
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 In this context, China‟s WAPI initiative would be reshaped by the government‟s 
release of the Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper in 2006. According to this policy 
paper, entitled „The Provisional Measures for the Accreditation of National Indigenous 
Innovation Products,‟ only products which are accepted to be made with „indigenous‟ 
intellectual property could qualify for „priority‟ in government procurement and „national 
key projects that spend Treasury funds.‟ The ultimate goal of this policy initiative is that 
by 2020 local manufacturing would be based primarily on independent or indigenous 
innovation (Howell, et al. 2010, 19). It is presumable to conclude that the drawback 
China lived in the WAPI case and other similar issues have played a decisive role in the 
developments leading to the release of this policy paper. As discussed in the next sub-
section, the release of this policy paper is also closely parallel to the change in the WAPI 
strategies implemented by the government authorities. The critical point with this policy 
paper is that it is very difficult for foreign enterprises to qualify for „indigenous‟ status to 
be preferred for public procurement (5). The policy paper also sets certain time frames 
for different sectors for compliance with this policy.  
One of the stated aims of the indigenous innovation policies for the government 
sector is to acquire products that are produced with local technology. To qualify as 
indigenous innovation, “a product must be produced by an enterprise that owns the 
intellectual property in China; has a trademark owned by a Chinese company and is 
registered in China; embodies a high degree of innovation; and is certified by the Chinese 
National Certification Commission” (Lubman 2010). These strategies have significant 
implications and consequences for foreign companies. In March 2010, a survey of 
American companies by the American Chamber of Commerce reveals that 28% of the 
203 respondents reported that they are losing business because of the policy, and over 
72 
 
half of the 49 technology companies surveyed foresaw that the new policy would affect 
their business. The policy has been applied to government procurement in a series of 
documents on indigenous innovation issued in recent years by the State Council, the 
Ministries of Foreign Trade and Science and Technology and the National Development 
and Reform Commission (quoted in Lubman 2010). According to another survey 
conducted by the Chamber; foreign companies are concerned the rules are discriminatory 
and may extend beyond the 599 billion Yuan ($87.8 billion) government-procurement 
market to orders from state-owned enterprises, which last year had combined revenue of 
22.5 trillion Yuan (quoted in Forsythe 2010).  
In a report about China„s indigenous innovation strategies and overall plan, 
Macgregor (n.d., 22) has defined these strategies as an elaborate and extensive system 
designed to build Chinese national champion enterprises and implement the indigenous 
innovation plan. It is built atop the solid base of foreign investment and ownership 
restrictions created in the 1990s, such as 50 per cent maximum ownership of car plants 
and minority ownership limits in sectors ranging from telecom to genetically modified 
organisms to new energy equipment. This industrial policy ecosystem includes: a 
domestic patent regime allowing the use of junk patents that can be employed to retaliate 
against foreign companies inside China which have filed IPR violation lawsuits against 
Chinese companies outside of China; compulsory certification and standards 
requirements that slow or block the entry of foreign products into the Chinese market; 
requirements for the disclosure of technology secrets and other proprietary information 
that serve to exclude foreign products from major Chinese markets; and uneven and lax 
enforcement of IPR protection. China has apparently focused on establishment of 
indigenous standards as a base for its technological capabilities. 
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Chinese government has also supported the Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper 
with other supplementary policies. „2006-2020 Medium and Long-Term Science and 
Technology Development Plan (2006),‟ for instance, favor indigenous innovation 
products in price-based bidding processes. According to this plan, if the price of an 
indigenous innovation product is higher than others, the company making the product can 
reduce the price in its bid. In such a situation, if the new bid price for the indigenous 
innovation product is not higher than other products, the government agency must 
procure it. In addition, several articles of „2007 Evaluation Measures on Indigenous 
Innovation Products for Government Procurement‟ award indigenous innovation products 
special treatment (The U.S. - China Business Council 2010, 3). 
The strategies for the implementation of indigenous innovation policies have 
become more complicated. In October 2009, several ministries jointly issued the „Notice 
on Launching the Accreditation of National Indigenous Innovation Products in 2010‟ and 
the „2009 Indigenous Innovation Products Accreditation Measures‟, which establish the 
link between Indigenous Innovation Products Catalogue and government procurement 
preferences. According to a United States Information Technology Office report (2010, 
5), the criteria to get a product into the catalogue included a trademark originally 
registered in China and more importantly Chinese intellectual property. These 
requirements would essentially drive foreign products out of the government procurement 
market for several high technology sectors. Moreover, even though a national catalog has 
not been released so far, according to the same report “while China has since backed 
away from creating a national product catalog as a result of wide-spread international 
opposition to the program, many policies that encompass China‟s Indigenous Innovation 
drive are structural, with direct consequences for market access and the ability of 
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American and other foreign firms to compete in China.” However, it is not clear that this 
is a deliberate strategy pursued by the Chinese authorities to mislead the international 
public interest. 
In addition, the Chinese government has also started to sponsor a series of 
„megaprojects‟ in conjunction with its High-Technology Program. Within the context of 
this report, the most noteworthy is a major initiative on standards, entitled „Key 
Technical Standards Project‟ which has included research and development support for 
the WAPI, AVS, 3G telephony, optical networks, IP technologies, and other standards 
that have gained prominence for the government. 29 standards have resulted from this 
work, and 13 of them have been submitted to the ISO, IEC, or the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) for consideration as international standards (Suttmeier, 
Tan and Yao 2006, 13). 
 In 2010, a USITC (2010) report raised the concerns of the US industry about the 
release of the „Proposed Regulations for the Administration of the Formulation and 
Revision of the Patent-Involving National Standards‟ in 2009 and rules for patented 
technology in standards. According to this report by the USITC (2010, 5-19), China‟s 
have draft rules established three general principles:  
(1) Mandatory national standards should not incorporate patented technologies 
as a general principle;  
(2) If a mandatory standard does involve a patent, the relevant government 
agency will negotiate license terms, and, failing to do that, could require compulsory 
licensing of relevant patents; and  
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(3) Patented technology relevant to national standards should not be included 
unless the patent holder agrees to grant a royalty-free license, or one that provides 
royalties at a price significantly lower than the norm.  
According to the USITC, these practices are in conflict with principles followed 
by standards setting organizations in other countries. The US Chamber of Commerce 
representative, Jeremie Waterman expressed industry‟s concerns about the Supreme 
People‟s Court of China‟s guidance to lower courts suggesting that IP incorporated into a 
national standard need not be compensated at the market value (238-239). In January 
2010, the China National Institute of Standardization (CNIS) requested comments from 
all stakeholders on its „Disposal Rules for Inclusion of Patents in National Standards,‟ as 
mentioned above. The Institute changed some of the draft rules based on feedback from 
foreign stakeholders, and excluded a number of provisions, particularly those related to 
compulsory licensing in mandatory standards and to requirements that royalties be 
licensed on a lower-than-fair basis. However, despite the international criticism, the 
disposal rules “require the disclosure of pending as well as existing patents during the 
formulation and revision of national standards, which may prove onerous for holders of 
patent applications that have not yet been published” (5-19). 
Remarkably, indigenous innovation policies seem to have created tension and 
concern among foreign investors and businesses. According to an American Chamber of 
Commerce survey; 28% of the 203 respondents reported that they are losing business 
because of the policy, and over half of the 49 technology companies surveyed foresaw 
that the new policy would affect their business (Lubman 2010). In addition, Business 
week (2010) has reported that foreign companies are concerned that the Chinese rules are 
discriminatory and may extend beyond the 599 billion Yuan ($87.8 billion) government-
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procurement market to orders from government owned enterprises, which had combined 
revenue of 22.5 trillion Yuan in 2009. 
In addition, there is sufficient reason to believe that these policies also include 
numerous informal practices which are not publicly announced. As, the Bureau of Export 
Administration (1999, 21) has reported that over the last several years these policies 
included provisions that call for advanced and continuous technology transfers as part of 
future joint venture agreements, preferential policies for foreign investors in China's 
electronics sector; export of 70 per cent of joint venture-manufactured products, high-
level review and approval of certain electronics joint ventures that must „conform to the 
state's industrial policies.‟ And joint ventures are supported by the government in „new 
generation‟ electronics such as broadband telecommunications as well as digital mobile 
communications products. Although, an industrial policy for the electronics sector has 
not been officially published, for instance, many foreign firms are allegedly open to 
arbitrary decisions and pressure by local, provincial, and central governments for 
technology transfers or commercial offset arrangements in exchange for market access.  
The Change in Strategies in WAPI 
As mentioned in the previous section, China has not completely stepped back 
from its insistence on the WAPI standard. When the Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper 
was released in 2006, products incorporating the WAPI standard had already be given 
preference in government procurement. The Policy Paper apparently reinforced this 
position. Behind this initial strategy, a more complex strategy for WAPI compatible 
products through public procurement and coalition building to support the standard seems 
to have cautiously been developed. 
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In March 2006, after the official launch of indigenous innovation policy, the 
government formed a WAPI Industry Alliance compromising of 22 top domestic 
information technology and telecom companies. WAPI was established as the sole 
standard for products eligible for government procurement, and WAPI technology was 
decided to be installed in stadiums for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. MIIT announced that 
previous ISO decisions would apply only to computers, and required that as of 2009, all 
mobile phones sold in China would support WAPI. But they were also allowed to 
simultaneously have Wi-Fi. Nokia, Motorola, Samsung and majority of the companies 
complied with these policies (Macgregor n.d., 29-30). 
In addition, this new set of strategies for WAPI includes opening of the 
algorithms to the foreign companies and extension of efforts to promote WAPI before 
ISO.  China has reportedly made the WAPI algorithms public so that foreign 
manufacturers can enter the wireless WLAN market in China. In the signing ceremony 
for Intel‟s new integrated circuit manufacturing facility in Dalian, China, for instance, the 
Vice-Minister of China urged Intel to support WAPI (Gibson, Paper 43 2007, 38). 
 However, despite these efforts, Chinese manufacturers have still lacked 
confidence in WAPI and continued to use the internationally accepted standard, Wi-Fi, 
according to some, implying the quiet commercial death of WAPI and the continued 
spread of Wi-Fi across the country.  
Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su (2008, 22-23) have commented that: “because of the 
broader coalitions supporting alternative technologies already operating beyond China, 
government intervention has at times delayed the introduction of foreign products but has 
not been able to ensure commercial success for China‟s own standards”. An analysis of  
this case implies that Chinese manufacturers are  interested more in the additional 
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transaction costs associated with use of a new standard which might not be accepted by 
the Global market, rather than the arguments of the Chinese government for the 






Chapter 4: The AVS Case 
 
AVS represents China‟s one of the important standards initiatives after China‟s 
WTO membership. AVS‟s development and adaptation processes differ significantly 
from the early stages of WAPI before the international reaction and the release of the 
indigenous innovation policy paper have changed its scope. Hence, this chapter examines 
the AVS case in more detail, in trying to analyze the change in China‟s strategies for 
Chinese standards initiatives.  
The work of the AVS Working Group is supported by many foreign observers for 
its transparency and openness to foreign participation. Moreover, it is generally regarded 
as a particularly positive example of a technically advanced and procedurally fair 
standards body, one that is open and internationalized in its proceedings and has devised 
a progressive set of policies for managing IPR issues through its patent pool system 
(Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 20). 
The explanation that I develop to account for this change in attitudes in terms of 
transparency and openness is that Chinese authorities have learned a lesson from their 
attempt to introduce a Chinese alternative to the DVD, the EVD that failed in the market 
in 2003 (China - EU Information Technology Standards Research Partnership 2010, 15-
16). 
This standard and other supplementary standards which are designed to guarantee 
compatibility with AVS in other product groups are the key to the China‟s massive audio-
visual products market. China, for instance, is expected to be world‟s largest digital TV 
market by 2012 and the China‟s audio-visual products market to grow even further. In 
addition, the market for network-capable digital consumer electronics, primarily TVs, is 
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also expected to surge. And according to Synerchip forecasts, digital TVs with network 
functions  is expected to grow from about 1.5 million sets in 2008 to about 86 million in 
2012 (cited in Nezu 2009). 
Given the importance of the sector for China‟s manufacture and export, one can 
find it understandable for the Chinese authorities to worry about high royalties paid to the 
foreign patent holders in this sector. The focus and the resources spent on the AVS 
initiative can be explained in part with the growing concerns about royalty payments for 
the internationally accepted MPEG standard for digital TV. According to Breidne and 
Hektor‟s unpublished paper „Standards Battle for Competition – ICT Strategies in China 
and Japan,‟ Chinese broadcasters wishing to use audiovisual compression technology 
which is based on the MPEG4 standard face licensing fees exceeding 10 billion RMB per 
year (cited in Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 11). 
In 2002, China started the work on development of a royalty free AV standard 
with direct participation of 24 foreign and seven Chinese companies. After nine years 
after its launch, the AVS Working Group and the patent pool comprise of over 100 
domestic and multinational companies (Audio and Video Coding Standard Workgroup of 
China n.d.). The working group compromises of such Chinese and foreign companies as 
Lenovo, Founder, Huawei, Intel, Legend Group, IBM, and LG, and such research 
institutes as Matsushita Research & Development (China), China Electronics 
Standardization Institute, Harbin Institute of Technology, and Electronics Standardization 
Institute), such universities as Tsinghua University, the University of Science and 
Technology of China, and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.  
In addition, many international companies and research institutes participate in 
the working group‟s activities as observant; companies like Cheertek, Fujitsu 
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Microelectronics (Shanghai), France Telecom China, Fujitsu Microelectronics 
(Shanghai), Envivio, Sony China, Texas Instruments, GSci-worx GmbH c, Sun 
Microsystem (China), and international research institutes like the Institute for Infocomm 
Research (Singapore) and the Beijing Samsung Communication Technology Research 
Institute (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, Appendix II).
 
 
MPEG-4 is the primary alternative international standard to the AVS standard. 
The AVS Working Group was established with the expectation that close cooperation 
with MPEG-China would be maintained. In June 2003, the CAS Institute of Computer 
Science was selected to lead the development of video coding software. Progress has 
continued on the various standards that comprise the AVS package (Suttmeier, Tan and 
Yao 2006, 20). 
 
Gao Wen from the CAS Institute of Computer Science has been the head of the 
working group since its establishment and leads the initiative. The working group is 
supported by the Ministry of Information Industry and under its direct control.  
From the very beginning, the new AVS standard‟s main purpose is to replace the 
MPEG standard and create a royalty free environment for the Chinese audio-visual 
industry. The new standard was claimed to be better than MPEG-2 and less expensive 
than MPEG-4, and to become China„s own independent standard for compression, 
decoding, processing and representation of digital audio-video (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 
2006, 20). 
The internationally accepted standard MPEG-4 consists of 23 separate standards 
related to audio-video coding. The primary alternatives to the AVS standards package are 
MPEG-4-Part 3, also known as advanced audio coding (AAC), and MPEG-4-Part 10, for 
advanced video coding (AVC), which is identical to the ITU‟s H.264 standard. VC-1 was 
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also adopted as a standard by the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers 
(SMPTE) (Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su 2008, 25).  
Some of the China‟s policy objectives behind WAPI and EVS standard initiatives, 
as explored in chapter three, have surfaced in the AVS standard initiative as well. The 
general belief is that Chinese manufacturers pay substantial royalties to the foreigners for 
the patents that have been unjustifiably  incorporated into international standards, and 
that the only way for a country to change its place in the production chain is to own the 
technology. 
In 2003, Gao Wen, the head of the AVS Working Group, has highlighted these 
points:  
The royalty fee on every device using MPEG2 standard is US$2.5. It is estimated 
that Chinese consumers may buy 400 million units of digital televisions and DVD players 
in the next 10 years, which means they may have to pay US$1 billion. However, in the 
case of the AVS standard, the electronic device makers only need to pay about 1 Yuan 
(US$0.12) per device and AVS members could pay even less. At the same time, China 
may also consume 300-500 million chips using MPEG2 technology, which will create a 
huge market worth US$300 billion. The AVS standard is also more efficient compared 
with the MPEG2. The compression ratio of AVS is 2.4 times of MPEG. Using the MPEG2 
technology, a normal DVD disc can only store less than 30 minutes of high-definition 
movies, but with the AVS standard, a disc is able to store a complete movie. (quoted in 
China Daily 2003) 
However, despite these arguments about the need for the development of Chinese 
standards with Chinese technology, Chinese home-made standards allegedly have many 
common traits with corresponding international standards. This verifies the concerns of 
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foreign patent holders who are suspicious of the intentions of the Chinese policy makers. 
Burger, et al. (2007, 6) have claimed that the AVS video code architecture is very similar 
to the international H.264 standard, but its complexity has been lowered down by using 
only 8** blocks, five intra modes, and other features: “Performance results show that 
under practical conditions used as benchmark the compression efficiency is almost the 
same as that of H.264 without sacrificing the visual quality.”
 
In this respect, many believe that the AVS incorporates the same foreign patents 
that are essential to the international standards. Moreover, a few companies that hold 
essential patents for the AVS standard are not members of the AVS Working Group and 
have not agreed to license their IP on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis. Another 
critical point is that some members of the AVS Working Group hold significant IP in the 
rival MPEG-4 and H.264 standards (Clendenin, Product Brief Chinese A/V Codec Rises. 
2006). Hence, in examining the AVS Standard, the overall impression is that by 
participating into the AVS Working Group or simply keeping their silence for the use of 
their patents, those foreign companies have chosen to compromise with the authorities. 
OBLIGATIONS TO THE PATENT POOL 
The key objective of the AVS Working Group is to create a royalty free standard 
for the Chinese manufacture. In 2003, Gao Wen is reported to have asked a group of 
experts “to create a recommendation for an IPR policy for AVS or create policies that: 
reflect and respect China law and culture, reflect WTO requirements, reflect successful 
global practices balance the rights of the inventor and needs of the implementers, 
innovative and forward looking and evolves with practice and law in China” (quoted in 
Gao 2005).  
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Henceforth, the AVS patent pool would become a critical component of the AVS 
Working Group. This patent pool would be based on the principals of non‐discrimination, 
voluntary participation, and non‐exclusivity. Moreover, “the pool should provide users 
with a single place to get a license for all essential patents, and therefore will attempt to 
attract all patent holders to participate” (Huang, Gao and Reader n.d., 5). The AVS patent 
pool‟s licensing strategies are determined in a strategic framework. As, the AVS patent 
pool is similar to traditional pools but obeys the pre‐defined competitive‐price licensing 
by AVS IPR policy (4). Although, the participation of foreign companies in the working 
group and the patent pool is supported though various means, the standard initiative has a 
very strict attitude towards IPR incorporation into standards and does not tolerate any 
independent IPR decision by any member company.  
According to these rules, if a member contributes a proposal, it must also disclose 
the patents in it and the licensing intentions. Participants have also certain obligations to 
commit to licensing and declare default terms for licensing their essential patents. 
Further, organizations contributing to the standard must disclose their intellectual 
property and their licensing terms for that contributed technology. The pool is expected to 
license only truly essential patents (4). 
Cliff Reader (2006, 308), a pioneering foreign consultant to the AVS Working 
Group, has explained this policy in more detail: 
The AVS IPR Policy has three main components. First, there is a commitment to 
license that is required from all AVS Members. This commitment includes a declaration 
of the basic license terms the IPR holder is willing to offer. Second, there is a disclosure 
requirement for patents, published patent applications and in certain cases, unpublished 
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applications. Third, there is protection for IPR holders against contribution of their IPR 
by third parties and preservation of their defensive patent rights. 
 
 
Illustration 3: The AVS Working Group IPR Obligations (Gao 2005). 
More importantly, member companies‟ motivation for participation seems also to 
have stemmed from their concern that their access to the Chinese market might be 
restricted for their non-compliance with this initiative. The Chinese government seems to 
have managed to convince (or coerce) foreign companies that they should continue 
cooperation with the government, even after the WTO membership of the country, 
through a new set of indigenous innovation policy strategies. According to Burger, et al. 
(2007, 6-7): "not having exclusive control over the price is a big, big problem for all of 
these companies. That's not something they have faced before, and it is not something 
they can easily accept, I'm sure they are concerned about a precedent being set.” 
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AN OPEN AND PARTICIPATORY STANDARD BODY  
Many observers of the AVS Working Group have argued that the working group 
is independent from the direct intervention of the Chinese government (Suttmeier, Tan 
and Yao 2006, 34). From various news and comments about the AVS Working Group 
and the patent pool, the general inference, however, is that the patent pool‟s IPR pricing 
strategies are under direct control of the Chinese government. And it seems to be a part of 
the government‟s general policy of creating royalty free standards and an environment for 
the Chinese companies. 
 
The critical divergence from the past is that the administration of the AVS 
Working Group has been given to the MII‟s Department of Science and Technology. 
Instead of being under CESI, the group was established in June 2002 by MII and MOST 
and reports directly to MII‟s Department of Science and Technology (Kennedy, 
Suttmeier and Su 2008, 17). The AVS Working Group has reportedly also diverged from 
the MII‟s old strategies after consulting international experts, and improved the 
conditions for international participation in the working group and the patent pool soon 
after this arrangement did not trigger a lot of participation (Slater 2009, 6-7). 
Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su (2008, 19) have contended that the working group has 
benefited from the suggestions of multinational corporations, and is sufficiently detailed, 
balanced, and open.  
It is clear that policy makers have changed their strategies for the success of the 
initiative after consulting with international consultants about the benefits of strategic 
openness and international participation.  
The policy makers have also intended to promote the AVS as an international 
standard.  The secretary of AVS industrialization association, Weiming Zhang is reported 
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to have said that: “the key to maintain the continuous competitiveness of AVS standards 
is open and merging. Open means that we need absorb good enterprises and technologies 
both domestic and exotic into AVS. Merging means we should have the confidence to 
join the international competition even dominate the formulation of international 
standards” (quoted in Source163 2009).  
To promote the AVs as an international standard, it needs to be transparent in its 
proceedings and open to the participation of various stakeholders, a lesson learned from 
the WAPI case as examined in chapter three. In 2006, Gao Wen announced that: “If all 
goes well, systems using AVS will be ready for market introduction by the third or fourth 
quarter, with potential applications ranging from satellite and cable set-top boxes to 
mobile phones and high- definition optical-disk players. The next step for backers will be 
to take the spec to the International Organization for Standardization / International 
Electro-technical Commission with the hope of making AVS an internationally accepted 
codec” (quoted in Clendenin 2006). 
STRATEGIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE STANDARD 
From the very beginning, the future of the AVS has been uncertain, owing largely 
to the fact that the MPEG series standards are accepted and widely used internationally. 
Like in other home-made standards initiatives in China, as much as in other countries, 
manufacturers and consumers tend to adapt to internationally accepted standards despite 
possible high royalties for the embedded patents. Even five years after the start of the 
AVS initiative, according to a National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report 
(Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su 2008, 24-25), most Chinese users of codec standards have 
adopted the international MPEG-2 standard. Netcom, which is controlled by the 
government, is China's second largest wired-line operator (Clendenin, China's AVS 
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Codec Gains More Top-Tier Support 2007).  Despite a pledge from China Netcom to use 
AVS in its IPTV network, it is only an exception to the broader trend. Internationally, 
VC-1 and MPEG4, by simplifying its licensing mechanism, have been adopted into both 
Blue-ray and HD DVD players, digital TV, and other technologies. 
Even from casual observation of the sector in China, it is clear that the sector is 
hesitant about adapting to the standard. EETimes (C. Yan, China Netcom Chooses AVS 
over H.264 for IPTV 2006) has reported that: “AVS and H.264 are said to be about the 
same in terms of technical performance, but some chip makers have privately said they 
remain skeptical.”   
However, at a critical point for the future of the AVS, in 2006, China Netcom, a 
major wire-line telecom company in China announced to fully implement a domestically 
developed codec in its fledgling IPTV network. EETimes (C. Yan, China Netcom 
Chooses AVS over H.264 for IPTV 2006) has also reported that use of the AVS by the 
China Netcom is a big break for its developers, “which have had a hard time selling it to 
the industry. China Netcom is running IPTV trial in five cities, one of which uses AVS 
while the other four use the more popular H.264.” 
Chinese companies concern mostly that the international standard H.264 is used 
on a much broader scale globally and has dominated the IPTV market. “The fact that 
AVS is a candidate is a positive acknowledgement of the technology, but does not mean 
it will be widely used in or outside of China” (C. Yan, Despite ITU Nod, China IPTV 
Codec's Future Unclear 2006). Hence, as regards the strategies of the AVS Working 
Group, Wen Gao has also been reported to say that: “AVS industrialization is still in the 
initial stage. Although it has no competitors in China, it faces with the severe competition 
from other international standards. So some nation support policies would make sense. 
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But in the long term, the promotion of AVS should not rely on policies. It should rely on 
the mature and development of market” (quoted in Source 163 2009).  
However, despite the reluctance of the Chinese institutions and manufacturers to 
use the AVS standard, many government institutions and government controlled 
companies have continued adapting to the standard on a gradual basis. As, similar to 
other standards initiatives in China, the government‟s support for and the adoption to the 
standard are not smooth processes and on many occasions slowed by the lack of 
coordination and disputes among different institutions or interest groups. Suttmeier, Tan 
and Yao (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 34) have argued that: “defining the interest of the 
Chinese state in standards is by no means straightforward and unambiguous.” Lack of 
coordination and ambiguous policies might basically reflect the organization of the 
Chinese bureaucracy. “The Chinese bureaucracy is not only vast and complex but also 
pervaded by numerous cross-allegiances and competing lines of authority. These exist 
across domains, such as telecommunications technology; within the same agency; 
between the national, regional and local layers of bureaucracy; and between the local and 
central braches of the same bureaucratic organization” (Bretznitz and Murphree 2011). 
However, an analysis of this initiative implies that China has diverged from its 
early strategies and learned not to focus its efforts on a single standard and associated 
technologies which might fail in the market.  
In 2003, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), for 
instance, rejected the AVS system in favor of MPEG-4, which represents a significant 
setback for the initiative (Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su 2008, 20).
 
In addition to this 
decision by a key stakeholder in the Chinese market, in the first critical commercial test 
of the standard, however, in its procurement decision, SARFT backed away from the 
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AVS and opted for the more familiar MPEG international standard (Suttmeier, Tan and 
Yao 2006, 34).  
In September 2006, China's second largest telecom carrier, China Telecom, and 
its largest telecom equipment maker, Huawei Technologies, have been reported by the 
EETimes (C. Yan, Despite ITU Nod, China IPTV Codec's Future Unclear 2006) to prefer 
the international standard H.264 over the AVS. Frank Caruso, a senior analyst at Huawei 
said that: “H.264 is low cost and the best option for IPTV.” Linde Zhang, vice general 
manager of China Telecom subsidiary Shanghai Telecom, also commented that: "For 
now, H.264 is a more mature a standard.” Although, some institutions announced to 
adapt to and use the AVS, the major players‟ and the industry‟s reluctance have 
continued over the year.  “Domestic telecom companies, including China Telecom, so far 
seem to favor H.264. But Huang Tiejun, secretary of the AVS working group, disagreed, 
claiming that there is budding support for AVS” (C. Yan, Despite ITU Nod, China IPTV 
Codec's Future Unclear 2006). 
Nevertheless, the working group has continued its efforts to develop and promote 
the standard. During the implementation process, by 2005, the AVS standard for video 
compression would become a national standard. As, the AVS standard includes four 
separate technical standards (systems, audio, video, and digital copyright management) 
(Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su 2008, 19-20).  
In addition to the recognition as a national standard, the AVS Working Group has 
developed new and complementary versions of the standard for different products. The 
final drafts of the first part (systems) and sixth part (DRM) were completed in July 2007 
and March 2007 respectively. The video standard was published in March 2006, targeting 
high definition and high quality digital broadcasting, digital storage media and other 
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related applications. It has also been approved by SARFT for mobile broadcasting 
applications. A new video standard, AVS Part 7 (AVS-M) specifically targeting mobile 
multimedia applications was also completed in June 2007 (Burger, et al. 2007, 6). 
 
 
Illustration 4: Standard Structure of AVS - Video (Gao 2005). 
Despite the recognition of the AVS standard as a national standard, the standard 
has never been mandatory. According to the WTO, voluntary standards are defined as 
„standards‟ and mandatory standards are defined as „technical regulations.‟ Yet, nothing 
prevents governments from promoting certain national standards through various ways. 
As a national standard, the AVS standard has been supported and promoted by several 
government institutions and companies, most notable of which is China Netcom. It has 
been reported that: “the development of AVS in various fields couldn‟t happen without 
the supports from nation policies. No matter AVS being confirmed to be the national 
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standards, or the Nation Development and Reform Commission‟s notice of supporting the 
AVS standards, government gives a lot of supports during every progress step of AVS” 
(Source163 2009). 
Moreover, in China most of the domestic broadcasting and TV standards are 
recommended instead of compulsorily enforced upon service providers (Burger, et al. 
2007, 2). However, those recommendations appear to be taken „seriously.‟ For instance, 
in 2007, to accelerate the popularization of AVS standard in the ground television 
broadcast, the AVS Industry Association announced its strategy as: “implementation of 
AVS in the double national standards of ground television broadcast to comply with the 
nation‟s „double national standards ground television broadcast system” (C. Yan, First 
time Chinese Government Procure AVS Products 2010). By 2010, there were 11 first tier 
cities in China that have deployed the AVS system. And another 13 first-tier cities are 
testing the system. In addition, in 2007, Chinese Set-top-box producers for the cable 
industry announced at least for the domestic market “to switch from MPEG-2 code to the 
Chinese AVS standard codec. The reason is disputes over licensing royalties for MPEG-2 
standard, issued by the MPEG Licensing agency (MPEG-LA) (Burger, et al. 2007, 5).  
As a national standard, public procurement and purchases of AVS compatible 
products seem to have supported the promotion of the standard, despite the reluctance of 
the sector to switch from more convenient international standards to the AVS. Promotion 
of the standard through the Chinese networks is also noteworthy in this respect. Yan 
(China Telecom to Launch AVS-based IPTV Trial 2007) has reported that: “in a market 
dominated by H.264, some observers believe it doesn't make much sense to switch to 
AVS, which may carry higher costs because of its immaturity. However, there is a sense 
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that political pressure rather than business sense is driving the decision. All of China's 
telecoms are state controlled.”   
An examination of the history and background of the AVS standard reveals the 
lack of coordination and even different views about the future of the AVS standard 
among government institutions in the process. In spite of that China Telecom, for 
instance, favors the international standard, H.264, by contrast, its rival; China Netcom is 
officially committed to the AVS (Clendenin, China's AVS Codec Gains More Top-Tier 
Support 2007). In 2007, China Netcom announced its plans to use AVS-based IPTV in 20 
cities by the end of that year, and reach 6 million AVS-based IPTV users in five to seven 
years, or 40 percent of its current broadband users (C. Yan, China Telecom to Launch 
AVS-based IPTV Trial 2007). However, despite its long term refusal of the AVS 
standard, China Telecom started preparing to test the AVS codec in one field trial in 2007 
(Clendenin, China's AVS Codec Gains More Top-Tier Support 2007).  
The Support of the China Netcom for and its use of the AVS standard became 
decisive for many Chinese companies to adapt to the standard. ST, the leading set-top 
box supplier in China, announced its support for AVS in 2007. While, showing a demo of 
the company‟s standard definition AVS platform at the China Content Broadcasting 
Network conference in Beijing, ST's general manager for Greater China is reported to 
have said that: "the rules of the game have changed a bit, originally, we weren't sure how 
much support this would get, but now some operators are insisting that if you don't have 
AVS on your roadmap then they won't talk to you” (quoted in Clendenin, STMicro Backs 
China‟s AVS Codec 2007). Clendenin (Clendenin, STMicro Backs China's AVS Codec 
2007) has also commented that: “expect other multinationals, such as Broadcom Corp., to 
quickly tip plans of their support for AVS, too. The change in attitude is caused by two 
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things. First, China Netcom has decided to use AVS in its IPTV rollout. Second, some 
vendors fear the government may increase its arm-twisting by telling companies they 
control to make AVS a required part of STB specs.” 
Moreover, in 2010, Weimin Zhang, the secretary of the AVS Industry Association 
announced that SARFT decided to procure AVS compatible products, marking the first 
public procurement of such products by Chinese government organization, which would 
be the milestone of the AVS‟s popularization (C. Yan, First time Chinese Government 
Procure AVS Products 2010).  
In addition to the use of public procurement as a strategy to accelerate the 
acceptance of the standard, the Chinese policy makers have also targeted development of 
the AVS compatible technologies for different industries. For instance, in 2007, the 
China Association for Standardization announced to approve the China Digital 
Multimedia Broadcast Mobile TV Handset Standard, CSA158-2007, as the association 
standard. The new standard is based on DAB, a recommended standard of the Radio, 
Film and Television Department and the AVS (Burger, et al. 2007, 4).
 
 
Some Chinese companies have proceeded in developing AVS-compliant chips. 
With its eye on the Chinese satellite set-top-box market, the best known startup, Celestial, 
has developed a system-on-chip that includes a hardwired accelerator for the AVS video. 
Vimicro Corporation, a maker of multimedia mobile-phone chips, is also reported to 
support the AVS, through a software decoder running on an embedded CPU (Clendenin, 





Technology Domain Technology Standard Incorporated AV 









CMMB H.264 (Primary) Not Decided 
AVS Not Decided 
Terrestrial Broadcast CTB/DTTV MPEG – 2 (Primary) × 
AVS AVS 




CBHD H.264  × 
AVS (Primary) AVS 
Wireless Metro Area Network McWILL WiMAX 
Table 3: Evolution of AV Codec Standards in China (China - EU Information 
Technology Standards Research Partnership 2010). 
In 2007, both Broadcom Corp. and Conexant Systems Inc. are also reported to 
have worked on chips for the AVS standard and joined STMicroelectronics, which had 
already supported the AVS in its software, and worked on a hardware optimized version 
that would be ready by the fourth quarter (Clendenin, China's AVS Codec Gains More 
Top-Tier Support 2007). Aidan O'Rourke, a Broadcom executive in charge of IPTV 
products, is also reported to have said that: “in that same time period, one of Broadcom's 
65-nanometer based products will include custom hardware accelerators to support 
AVS.” A spokeswoman for Conexant also announced that: “Conexant plans to have its 
silicon ready for sampling by the first quarter of 2008.” Texas Instruments is also 
reported to have been able to offer DSP-based support (Clendenin, China's AVS Codec 
Gains More Top-Tier Support 2007). 
 In 2009, Broadcom Corp announced that: “its continued collaboration with 
RaisingSun Digital Video Technology Co of Shanghai, China, has produced a next-
generation 'all-in-one' digital television (DTV) turnkey solution that supports all Chinese 
broadcasting standards, including AVS, as well as Internet connectivity” (Nikkei 
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Electronics Asia 2009). This was the first complete DTV solution for television 
manufacturers in China that supports the AVS for high-definition (HD).  
As of December 2007, China‟s Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and CNC 
are reported to have collaborated to drive industrial implementation of the AVS standard. 
They conducted trial tests on the use of AVS-IPTV for commercial purposes in Dalian, 
China as of 2006, “establishing a solid foundation for future IPTV developments 
nationally and internationally” (Nikkei Electronics Asia 2007). 
The Chinese authorities apparently believe that the IPTV market has a great 
potential and target this market segment. In the first quarter of 2007, IPTV users in 
Shanghai increased to 220,000 according to a report from Analysis International (quoted 
in C. Yan, China Telecom to Launch AVS-based IPTV Trial 2007). It is also reported 
that IPTV users in China increased to 612,000 in the first quarter in 2007, driven 36 
percent higher than the quarter before (C. Yan, China Telecom to Launch AVS-based 
IPTV Trial 2007).  
The government‟s promotion of the AVS is not limited to the Chinese market. 
Recently, China has begun to promote the AVS standard in its neighbors through the 
Chinese government companies in the region. Thailand's International Engineering 
Public Company (TIEC), the China Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and the United 
States' Telairity Inc. announced to work together to implement and deploy a digital video 
mobile broadcasting network throughout Thailand. With Telairity's assistance and 
supported by CBC, the IEC selected CMMB technology (PR Newswire 2011).  
Chinese Broadcast Mobile TV Specification, CMMB, has also used AVS as its 
codec (Clendenin, STMicro Backs China's AVS Codec 2007). The CMMB technical 
standard is reportedly similar in concept but more advanced and cost-effective than the 
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European Union's DVB-H protocol.  Over the last two years, CMMB has attracted many 
mobile phone manufacturers in China including Motorola, Samsung and Nokia, as well 
as major Chinese auto manufacturers, Audi, Mercedes-Benz, China FAW, and China 
SAIC. Over 5,000 multipoint, terminal and mobile worldwide phone models are 
compatible with the CMMB mobile broadcasting signal (PR Newswire 2011).  
 Similar to China‟s turning of the Beijing Olympics into a show case for many of 
its technologies (IPv6, etc.); the Chinese government turned 2010 Guangzhou Asia 
Games into a show case for the AVS. During the games, AVS 3D television broadcast 
was deployed in the stadium and main public areas in Guangzhou. It was the first 
application of 3D television based on the AVS standard in the international arena. This 
was the use of the AVS 3D encoder, HD (High Definition) set-top box. According to the 
Guangzhou Science and Technology Bureau, the deployment of AVS 3D in Guangzhou 
Asian Games would benefit the AVS industry in Guangzhou by about 1 billion Yuan 
(Audio and Video Coding Standard Workgroup of China 2010). 
However, Chinese companies‟ attitude towards the AVS standard does not satisfy 
the expectations of the policy makers about the future of and the need for the AVS 
standard. During this process, many companies have expressed their hesitations. For 
instance, a spokesperson for Broadcom Corp. said that: “Broadcom Corp. would 
eventually develop technology for AVS, but it remains cautious at this point. LSI Logic 
Corp., an early mover in supporting China's optical-disk standard, is holding off. And 
SigmaTel Inc., a member of the AVS Working Group, is evaluating the codec but doesn't 
yet have plans to support a hardwired implementation of AVS, as it has for MPEG-4” 
(quoted in Clendenin, Product Brief Chinese A/V Codec Rises 2006). 
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Companies, in response, tend to target inter-operability between AVS and other 
competitive standards in their products, particularly H.264. For instance, in 2007, Texas 
Instruments and NSCC announced the delivery of the industry's first single-chip IPTV 
set-top box solution enabling dual decoding of AVS and H.264 to ensure interoperability 
between the standards. “It is an open research field though the issues at stake are mainly 
at the technological level due to the similarity between the two standards. Research 
performance optimization with focus on hardware implementation is ongoing, for both 
coding and decoding architecture” (Burger, et al. 2007, 6-7).
  
In 2008, Imagination Technologies Group, a licensor of intellectual property 
cores, announced that its PowerVR VXD380 video decoder supports the AVS, along with 
high and standard definition TV standards (Clarke 2008). Clendenin (China's AVS Codec 
Gains More Top-Tier Support 2007) has also reported that: “a handful of Chinese chip 
companies are also targeting AVS for set-top boxes. SVA Co and Beijing-based United 
Source Coding Co. have developed an encoder and Longjing Microelectronics Co., 
Grandview Semiconductor, and Celestial Semiconductor are working on decoders.” In 
addition, in 2008,
 
Imagination Technologies, a leader in System-on-Chip Intellectual 
Property (SoC IP), announced that its new POWERVR™ VXD380 advanced video 
decoder would support all major HD and SD video formats, including the AVS standard 
(Design & Reuse 2008). 
From the examination of the case, it is clear that China‟s experience with the AVS 
has been shaped through its experience with international parties in other standards 
initiatives and the implementation of indigenous innovation policies developed and 
implemented after China‟s WTO membership. However, there is not a consistent 
roadmap designed for the AVS. Different government institutions, perhaps different 
99 
 
interest groups have not reached a compromise over the AVS standard for a long time. 
And, the China Telecom insisted for a long time on using international standards instead 
of the Chinese AVS standard. In conformity with the main framework of the indigenous 
policies, the AVS standard has not been accepted as a mandatory standard. However, as a 
national standard, the government has increasingly promoted the standard through public 
procurement requirements and purchase by government companies. 
As, many observers of the initiative have verified, development of the AVS 
standard has been open to foreign participation and transparent, in contrast to earlier 
examples by China, particularly WAPI. Even though, the AVS standard incorporates 
many basic patents from international standards, the companies that own these essential 
patents seem to have chosen to stay away from any confrontation with the Chinese 
government, and some of them even joined the AVS patent pool. More importantly, 
Chinese authorities, this time, have tried to broaden the coalition supporting the AVS 
standard. 
However, it is not clear that China has benefited so far from the AVS standard as 
envisioned for by the Chinese policy makers. Many Chinese consumers have continued 
to prefer products that are compatible with existing international standards and still sold 
at reasonable prices. And, Chinese manufacturers have continued to produce goods that 
have inter-operability between different standards. Whether the MPEG and other 
international standards patent pools have decreased their royalty rates as a result of the 
threat of the AVS is one of the important questions for further research. 
In a report issued in 2007, market researcher iSuppli has noted that AVS would 
coexist with H.264 in the Chinese market. Whereas, H.264 would be the dominant 
standard in the long run, capturing about 60 percent of the IPTV market by 2011 (cited in 
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Clendenin, China‟s AVS Codec Gains More Top-Tier Support 2007). This situation 
poses more questions about the success of the Chinese government in creating royalty 
free standards for the Chinese manufacture. Those manufacturers seem to use both of the 










Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis of the WAPI and AVS Cases in 
Retrospect  
 
“Chinese autocracy is a learning autocracy” 
                                                                  Thomas Friedman (2011) 
 
China‟s indigenous innovation policies aim at using China's superior market 
power to convince or allegedly coerce foreign companies to transfer and license their 
latest technology to Chinese companies. Chinese government has mandated to replace 
core foreign technology in critical infrastructure, such as chips, software and 
communications hardware, with Chinese technology within a decade. According to 
Macgregor (Time to Rethink U.S.- China Trade Relations 2010) the tools to accomplish 
this include: “a foreign-focused anti-monopoly law, mandatory technology transfers, 
compulsory technology licensing, rigged Chinese standards and testing rules, local 
content requirements, mandates to reveal encryption codes, excessive disclosure for 
scientific permits and technology patents, discriminatory government procurement 
policies, and the continued failure to adequately protect intellectual property rights.”  
Both the WAPI and AVS standards initiatives, therefore, should be assessed 
under light of the China‟s indigenous innovation policies and the policy framework of 
China‟s WTO membership. 
Under strong international pressure, the forces underlying the implementation of 
indigenous innovation policies in China seem to have crystallized in the classic example 
of the WAPI standard. From the examination of the WAPI case and observation of the 
AVS case, it can be observed clearly that China‟s WTO membership and the hardship it 
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has faced since then, as exemplified best by the WAPI standard, have not led to a leading 
edge change in the Chinese policies.  
However, strategies and approaches to achieve these policies have continued to 
change and evolve. Some of these strategies are not novel either in China or in other East 
Asian countries; they seem to have a new strategic value and to be a part of a new set of 
policy strategies in this framework. 
In this context, the Chinese government seems to be committed to the 
development of Chinese home-made standards to achieve some of the objectives of the 
indigenous innovation policies. However, there is both a diversity of interests within the 
state regarding particular standards and a diversity of policy tools (such as regulation, 
procurement, and research and development  support) that can be employed in the 
implementation and promotion of these standards (Suttmeier, Tan and Yao 2006, 34). 
In trying to explain the variation in strategies, Suttmeier and Yao (Suttmeier and 
Xiangkui 2004, 43) have contended that attention to standards, and a new appreciation 
for the power of procurement in advancing technologies, seems to be a response to 
China‟s WTO accession. “In execution, some of the standards-based policies could be 
construed as inconsistent with the spirit of WTO agreements and as narrowly 
protectionist measures implemented by a strongly techno-nationalist regime.” According 
to the United States Information Technology Office (2010, 11): “China seeks to foster the 
domestic development of innovative technologies and IPR in part through technology 
mandates or promotion of unique national standards. This policy is also implemented 
through direct or indirect interference by Chinese authorities in licensing negotiations 
between Chinese and foreign technology companies.”  
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 This chapter examines the change in the policy strategies of China through a 
comparison of the WAPI standard initiative‟s initial perspective, particularly before 
official declaration of the indigenous innovation policies, and the AVS initiative. This 
report assumes that the AVS case presents a beneficial opportunity to analyze the 
Chinese policies and the pattern of the change through China‟s WTO membership and 
the release of the Indigenous Innovation Policy Paper.  
In this new era, majority of the non-tariff barriers set by China were eliminated on 
paper (Macgregor, Time to Rethink U.S.- China Trade Relations 2010). Moreover, as 
observed in the strategy change in the WAPI standard and in the AVS working group and 
the patent pool, the government has expanded its cooperation with foreign companies and 
apparently encouraged their participation in these initiatives. WAPI‟s mandatory nature 
has also left its place to non-mandatory „national standards strategy‟ which is promoted 
through public procurement and purchases of government companies and government 
controlled institutions. It is clear that the new set of strategies is more complicated than 
the early WAPI standard initiative‟s mandatory and close nature, which triggered 
international reaction against the WAPI standard. 
As discussed later, one other factor that stands out from the examinations of these 
cases is the concern for the IPR incorporated into standards. These strategies are no way 
unique to China‟s WTO membership era; however, they have become more significant, 
given the international legal restrictions and sensitivities. Through various strategies, 
Chinese authorities have tried to create a royalty free environment for the Chinese 
manufacture and institutions by incorporating them into the Chinese standards. In the 
AVS case, China seems also to have learned a valuable lesson from the WAPI initiative, 
and kept the setting of the standard and its codes transparent and open to foreign 
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participation. According to some, by encouraging and even „coercing‟ foreign 
participation, China tries to acquire foreign patents through incorporating them into these 
Chinese standards which are arguably not so different from international standards.  
Chinese policy makers encountered an outrageous reaction against the way the 
WAPI standard was set and introduced to the outside world. However, they have 
explored the limits of their policy options in this new era by trial and error, and started to 
focus on staying away from direct confrontations with the foreign governments or 
through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The WAPI‟s encryption codes have 
also been opened to both domestic and foreign companies, owing largely to the 
international criticism against the initial practice. Even before this outcome, Suttmeier 
and Yao (2004, 43-44) have predicted that: “even in the hotly contested WAPI case, the 
forces of globalization are likely to temper the techno-nationalist inspirations behind the 
standard, yielding an outcome which is likely to reflect elements of both conflict and 
cooperation.”  
According to Macgregor (2010) China has long been a „pay-to-play‟ market for 
foreigners, with mandated joint ventures in key industries, local manufacturing 
requirements and forced technology transfers as the price of market admission.  China‟s 
WTO accession in 2001 was believed remove the bulk of those barriers. However, 
arguably, China still plays the same policy game with new instruments, by showing 
necessary flexibility in its strategies. 
As summarized from the examination of these two cases, these key strategies and 
approaches are hardly unique to either of the cases. However, they tell much about the 
ways that China‟s home-made standards are promoted and adapted, foreign technologies 
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are acquired, within the framework of the forces underlying China‟s WTO membership 
era.  
Some of these strategies are noteworthy in that they were used by Japan as non-
tariff barriers in an early period, and then Taiwan to acquire foreign technology, two of 
the East Asian countries that China allegedly drew inspiration. The Japanese case is well 
documented; Japan used its national standards to protect its domestic market effectively 
until it faced considerable international pressure during the GATT negotiations. 
Standards are still used by many countries as a non-tariff barrier to international trade. 
However, these policies have become harder to implement, especially at import controls, 
by the WTO countries. Nevertheless, most of the China‟s strategies are not novel; they 
are implemented within the new framework of the WTO and attract more international 
attention than other countries due to the size of the Chinese economy. 
This is in part why a closer look at China‟s strategies and approaches in these two 
cases is critical to understand the “learning autocracy” (Friedman 2011). As explored in 
chapter four, the AVS standard apparently resembles the international standards and has 
perhaps incorporated many of patents in these standards. The WAPI standard, whereas, 
arguably includes many common features with the international standards, owing largely 
to the incorporated technologies, despite the fact that, at the beginning, the encryption 
codes of the WAPI standard were not revealed to the foreign companies. In this regard, 
our first question is how the foreign IP is acquired and why foreign patent holders have 






Table 4: Comparison of WAPI and AVS Initiatives.  
At this point, one of the explanations is that these strategies are closely related to 
the general IPR regime of China, which generally provides weak or thin protection. And 
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it is a strategic component of the country‟s indigenous innovation policies. The key point 
for the first question lies in the IPR environment of China and various forms of IPR 
approaches under the indigenous innovation policies. For instance, according to a USITC 
report (2010): 
Some industry representatives have argued that Chinese standards-setting bodies 
frequently take an existing standard and change the technology only slightly, just enough 
to add costs and make it more difficult for foreign manufacturers trying to sell their 
products in China. To the extent that Chinese-developed standards include indigenous 
IP, they also reduce the royalties that Chinese firms must pay to foreign firms whose 
technology often forms a critical component of the global standard. 
The second question of this chapter is how the Chinese policy makers try to 
promote the AVS standard without enforcing mandatory rules. The key strategy here is 
that some of the major public institutions and government companies have adapted the 
standard and used it in their procurements or purchases, promoting the standard through 
its network affects in various inter-related sectors.  
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND JOINT VENTURES STRATEGIES  
In a report by the European Union‟s IPR SME Help Desk (Technology Transfer 
to China, Guidance for Business 2008) foreign companies are warned that they might be 
forced to enter into joint ventures with Chinese companies for access to the Chinese 
market in some designated sectors: “Approval to form a joint venture or to operate may 
depend on the supply of specific technology, including future improvements of this 
technology. In some cases, the partner cannot be freely chosen and may be a competitor 
or concurrent Joint Venture partner of another competitor. In other cases, the enlargement 
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of a pre‐existing investment may require the set‐up of a local R&D Centre or other forms 
of transfer of know‐how.” 
In addition to specific rules about bidding requirements of technology transfer, 
China's market size is often used as a justification in the bidding process to give the 
contract to whichever company promises the greatest transfer of know‐how. In addition, 
“Chinese Government specifically selects certain industrial sectors in which technology 
transfer strategies, localization and reduction of reliance on imports are to be 
implemented (EU China IPR SME Help Desk 2008).” 
In those technologically critical sectors, the government never allows foreign 
direct investment out of its control. Forming a joint venture with a Chinese partner, in 
many cases, is the only way to access many sectors. Even when the foreign partner‟s 
investment is over fifty per cent of the venture, the government finds a way to control the 
establishment. For instance, even after 3Com‟s, a major international internet company, 
buying of a 49% stake of the joint venture, Huawei-3Com, which had been held by 
Huawei, many still believe that the joint venture is still controlled by the government, 
despite the fact that Huawei-3Com has thus become a wholly owned foreign enterprise.  
Only a few foreign companies have chosen not to compromise with the Chinese 
government and refrain from these kinds of partnerships despite the risk of getting swept 
from the Chinese market. Ericsson Communication Software Research and Development 
(Shanghai) Co. Ltd. (RDC) case sets an example of this. The Chinese government 
reportedly exerted pressure on Ericsson to form a joint venture. However, Ericsson chose 
not to do so, since the Chinese company would likely compete with Ericsson in 
Ericsson‟s global technology activities, if it shared proprietary technologies and the 
intellectual property (Dadgson, Kastelle and Mathews 2006, 95). 
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However, this is an exception to the rule and joint ventures are the only way for 
many foreign companies to enter the Chinese market, particularly the growing public 
procurement market. It is remarkable that public procurement is also used as a multi-
purpose strategy tool by the authorities. Suttmeier and Yao (2004, 36) have maintained 
that: “at a time when WTO obligations are constraining China‟s use of older instruments 
of industrial policy, being formally unconstrained in the procurement area provides an 
attractive tool for the state to pursue its technological priorities.”  The U.S. - China 
Business Council  (2010, 22) has also reported that: “the primary and most explicit 
benefit conferred upon products that receive indigenous innovation recognition is 
preference in government procurement.”  
In 1998, the Chinese public procurement market amounts to 3.1 billion Yuan, 
accounting for a mere 0.04 percent of GDP or 0.29 percent of government expenditure. 
The size of the public procurement market has grown rapidly since then, reaching 101 
billion Yuan (roughly US$12 billion) in 2002, amounting to 9.64 percent of GDP or 4.58 
percent of government spending  (Suttmeier and Xiangkui 2004, 36). The USITC (2010, 
5-9) has also reported that this market for goods and services was estimated to be $88 
billion per year in 2008, equal to 2 percent of China‟s GDP and making up almost 10 
percent of Chinese government expenditures. This figure, moreover, does not include 
significant levels of public investment in infrastructure projects. In 2010, the American 
Chamber of Commerce in China estimated that public works projects accounted for at 
least 50 percent of total Chinese government procurement funding, and the total annual 
value of government procurement contracts accounted for almost $200 billion (cited in 
the USITC, 2010, 5-9). 
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Despite these astonishing figures, some observers of the Chinese public 
procurement market claim that the actual size is even larger. The U.S. - China Business 
Council  (2010, 22) has attributed this claim to that schools, hospitals, museums, state 
owned enterprises, and other public entities are subject to varying degrees of influence 
from central and local governments. 
 Several US companies have reported: “increasing difficulty in making sales to 
government-related entities in China, including government agencies, public institutions 
such as schools and hospitals, and SOEs [State Owned Enterprises]” (cited in the USITC, 
2010, 5-9). The environment for foreign companies in China‟s government procurement 
market is reportedly deteriorating. 
In addition to granting priority in government procurement to the products 
produced with domestic technologies, government strategies award indigenous 
innovation products with other kinds of special treatment. For instance, the „Selected 
Supporting Policies for the 2006-20 Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology 
Development Plan (2006)‟ also favors indigenous innovation products in price-based 
bidding processes (The U.S. - China Business Council 2010, 22).  
Even though in some sectors, government owned establishments are not required 
to abide by government‟s procurement regulations, they are reported to implicitly honor 
regulations that establish preferences for Chinese companies (USITC, 2010, 5-9). In this 
regard, the mandate in Article 20 of the National IP Strategy issued to all government 
institutions is also noteworthy: “Properly balance the relationship between patent 
protection and public interest. While protecting patents, perfect compulsory licensing 
system, give play to exception system, study and make reasonable policies, insure access 
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to essential products and services timely and sufficiently in case of a public crisis” 
(quoted in Slater, 2009, 8). 
Another policy instrument for public procurement is the public procurement 
catalogs used by the local governments. However, as of September 2010, there is not any 
central government catalogue for indigenous innovation products; ten provincial and 
municipal governments released 25 publicly available catalogues identifying indigenous 
innovation products between 2006 and 2010. Eight additional provincial and municipal 
governments have also formulated indigenous innovation catalogues. The provincial 
catalogues list the preferred products for government and government owned enterprise 
procurement and purchase. These catalogs do not include any products made by foreign 
companies, effectively excluding foreign companies from provincial government 
procurement markets unless there is no Chinese-made alternative to a foreign product. 
Furthermore, “some observers view these as „trial balloons‟ for the central government‟s 
expected catalogue” (USITC, 2010, 5-12). 
Furthermore, lax enforcement of the law and government regulations and the non-
transparent network of relations of government institutions and companies appear to 
contribute to these strategies. “Government entities and corporations are giving contracts 
to specific companies. China is a huge market and a lot of companies have interest to be 
there” (The Telecommunications Industry Association, pers. comm., 11/11/2010). 
Foreign countries view some of these Chinese firms with suspicion because of 
their close ties with the Chinese government. Some believe that they try to access foreign 
technology under government direction.  Shah (2010) wrote that: 
Huawei was founded by former Chinese army officers while ZTE too has close 
relations with the administration. This frequently puts them at a disadvantage while 
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bidding for non-Chinese projects. Huawei and ZTE were banned by the Indian 
government due to security concerns. USA has also put obstacles over Huawei acquiring 
telecom equipment maker 3Com.While USA does not want these 2 firms to acquire state 
of the art technology, India does not wish them Chinese firms to be involved in building 
critical communications infrastructure. While both firms have tried to assuage concerns, 
it has not managed to convince the governments in these countries as of now…Huawei 
has managed to become the 2nd largest telecom equipment producer in a short span of 
10 years by overtaking stalwarts like Motorola, Nokia Siemens and others. This has 
naturally led to allegations of technology pilfering and stealing of trade secrets. Cisco 
had earlier filed a case against Huawei which was later settled. Now Motorola has filed 
a case in the USA accusing the top management of Huawei of knowingly being involved 
in the theft of proprietary Motorola information. 
From an observation of these practices, it is clear that, in addition to the special 
treatment of domestic technologies under the indigenous innovation policies, public 
procurement strategies serve to the promotion of the Chinese standards, throughout its 
launch and promotion of the AVS and later of the WAPI standards, when they are 
adapted as „national standards.‟  
In retrospect, participation of the foreign companies in the AVS Working Group 
and the patent pool is inextricably linked to these strategies examined above and the IPR 
environment where co-operation and technology sharing with the government is to the 
benefit of foreign companies. Yet, most of the time, there is not any reported direct action 
by the government against foreign companies. The Telecommunications Industry 
Association (pers. comm., 11/16/2010), for instance, has reported that there is not any 
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complaint about forced patent pool participation or IP licensing in China to the 
association. 
These companies merely find it in their own interests to be the partners of the 
government in such joint initiatives or not raising their complaints. Texas Instruments, for 
instance, indicated its intention to support the WAPI standard and its general manager for 
Asia, Cheng Tianzong has been reported to say that: “it was reasonable for China to make 
its own standards in light of its national security concerns and that, furthermore, Texas 
Instruments needs the Chinese market and wants to cooperate with Chinese enterprises 
(quoted in Suttmeier and Yao, 2004, 30).” Texas Instruments also supports the AVS 
standard and has joined the patent pool.  
JUNK PATENTS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS 
China‟s accession to the WTO has paved the way for a new era both for China 
and the world economy. Since then, China has increased the level of IPR protection and 
extended it to many product groups which had been excluded from IPR protection. 
Macgregor (n.d., 26-27) has reported that: 
 China‘s original March 1984 patent law was amended several times to bring it 
into closer alignment with international standards. A group of 1992 amendments added 
food, pharmaceutical and chemical products as eligible items for patents. They also 
extended ―invention‖ patent rights to 20 from 15 years, and ―utility‖ patent rights to 10 
years from five years. In 1994, China joined the International Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT), and the Chinese patent office was qualified to receive and process international 
patent applications. In 2000, China‘s patent law was amended to try to bring it into 




However, despite the extension and strengthening of IPR legally, some observers 
claim that use of junk patents is widespread to circumvent the claims of foreign patent 
owners and silence them for their infringed IPR in „indigenous technologies‟ or „Chinese 
standards.‟ And, the threat of suing foreign companies that own some of the essential 
patents for China for infringing „the Chinese patents‟ help the policy makers silence the 
foreign companies. The lax enforcement of IPR and the justice system that is clearly open 
to government intervention seem to have contributed to development of this environment 
and created a blurred legal base for many foreign companies. 
One of the policy instruments that might have been used by the Chinese 
government in the AVS case is junk patents. By using this policy instrument, China 
implicitly threatens foreign companies that dare to confront Chinese companies with 
patent infringement law suits in other countries with their existence in China. In 2009, 
Chinese nationals accounted for 877,611, or nearly 90 percent, of 976,686 patent 
applications in China. 230,000 of these patents were „invention‟ patents which require 
detailed information and undergo detailed review. Utility patents‟ number was 308,861. 
Design patents totaled 339,654. So nearly three-quarters of Chinese patent filings were in 
the „junk‟ category (Macgregor n.d., 26-27).  
In a case reported by Macgregor (27): 
In September 2007, just three months before the list of 16 indigenous innovation 
megaprojects was unveiled…the Intermediate People‘s Court in the coastal city of 
Wenzhou ordered the French electronics giant Schneider Electric to pay the Chint Group 
of Wenzhou RMB 334.8 million (about US $50 million) in damages for infringement of 
Chint‘s China ‗utility model‘ patent. This unprecedented penalty, 17 times higher than 
any previous IPR award in China, was undoubtedly approved at high Party levels as the 
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Chint - Schneider dispute had been elevated to bilateral discussions as high as French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and President Hu.  
According to Macgregor (27), „junk patents‟ prove to be a powerful weapon 
against foreign companies. It was “a perfect case for China to use as a warning to 
multinationals who believe they will be able to sue Chinese companies for IPR 
infringement outside of China while continuing to operate unimpeded in the Chinese 
market.” Although there have not been any reported compulsory licensing cases, 
compulsory licensing provisions has been expanded. For instance, when a patent holder 
does not „sufficiently exploited the patent without any justified reason‟ within three
 
years 
of approval, or when a court or administrative organization has determined that the patent 
is not being used in order to eliminate or restrict competition, with the new provisions 
Chinese authorities might force foreign companies to license technology in China. 
These new provisions about the implementation of IPR appear to be justifying the 
actions of the government in the eyes of the foreign patent holders, even though the 
government might not need to adhere to using them. Chinese government officials might 
have developed these initiatives to test the limitations of traditional compulsory licensing 
(Slater 2009, 1). 
Slater (2009, 4) has also raised the question of whether the remaining gaps 
between China‟s patent law and the WTO TRIPS compulsory licensing safeguards are 
intentional, a lack of understanding, errors in translation, or a combination of the above. 
“It will not be certain until the compulsory license provisions in the Third Amendment 
are tested through implementing rules and actual patent licensing cases” (1). 
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UNEVEN AND LAX IPR PROTECTION 
Although, IPR protection is uneven and open to arbitrary decisions by the 
authorities, it is not clear that uneven and lax IPR protection is deliberately forged upon 
foreign companies by the Chinese government to acquire foreign technology. On many 
occasions, however, government authorities do not hesitate to take advantage of weak 
IPR protection. According to a foreign lawyer working in China (pers. comm., 
2/16/2011): “Chinese judicial system is almost controlled by the government and open to 
arbitrariness. Foreign companies know that risk of investing in China; companies know 
that they eventually have to deal with the government. Foreign companies cannot count 
on the judicial system, but have to deal with the government authorities.” 
As examined in the previous sections about the use of junk patents and foreign 
patents‟ incorporation into the Chinese home-made standards, the government authorities 
have also the legal means to use these strategies. Even the existing legal protections and 
practices compromise an area that is open to arbitrariness and the government authorities 
do not hesitate to use in their advantage. Nonetheless, it is not possible to clearly verify 
that the problems in the judicial system are related to a certain IP or standards policy, it is 
arguably a common trait of the judiciary. Historically, Chinese legal system was not 
independent from the state and supreme. Furthermore, many government agencies are 
closely involved in business affairs and local governmental agencies have powers to 
interpret regulations, issue licenses and impose taxes. This furnishes ample scope for 
negotiations and corruption within the system (Dolles and Wilmking 2005, 9-10).  
Although, China has introduced many legislative changes to strengthen the IPR 
regime and protection, the current system still suffers from such uncertainty.  The 
interpretation of agreements can depend on the influence or autonomy that the Chinese 
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partner enjoys with higher authorities. The signing of a formal contract does not 
guarantee certainty or even the conclusion of negotiation (Child 1998, 256).  
In addition to the holes in the laws, lax enforcement and uneven protection stand 
out as the causes of foreign companies‟ reluctance to open patent infringement suits. 
According to the 2005 position paper of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in 
China: “while multinationals have been criticizing the weak IPR protection in China with 
one voice, they rarely initiate infringement litigations, whether through judicial means or 
administrative channels” (as cited in Liang and Xue 2010, 481). Furthermore, the judicial 
procedure about infringement is costly and complicated, and the administrative 
enforcement mechanism is often weak. Many observers of the system believe that many 
IPR infringement cases are not filed in courts (Liang and Xue 2010, 481-482).  
In addition to the weaknesses in the IPR system, incorporation of patents into the 
standards gives the government another leverage to circumvent the IPR protection. 
Although, the national standard-setting authorities in China have not yet established 
public disclosure and use rules of patents in relevant standards, if a patentee engages in 
the setting of a standard or agrees to the patent‟s incorporation into a standard, the 
patentee is considered to have licensed the patent while implementing the standard by 
law. As, the use or exploitation by other people of the patent does not constitute patent 
infringement provided by Article 11 of the Patent Law (Slater 2009, 7). In other words, 
entry into the AVS patent pool and other standards initiatives is a key step towards 
dismantling associated IPR.  
The critical question here is whether China deliberately enforces uneven and lax 
IPR protection, and even it does so, whether such policy strategies violate the WTO rules 
or principles. Patricia Hansen, for instance, said that: “it can be said that laws adopted by 
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China undermine effective enforcement of patent rights. Also, uneven protection is 
impeaching the WTO principles.” However, she added that: “it is not a strong argument 
and mostly depends on the technical capacity of the host countries” (pers. comm., 
2/22/2011). 
On the other hand, as regards the compulsory licensing provisions of the Chinese 
IPR law, Patricia Hansen has also argued that China‟s compulsory licensing provisions 
which are arguably in conformity with the WTO rules are without a strong theoretical 
basis: “WTO panels interpret TRIPS exceptions very narrowly, even for the developing 
countries. That‟s why governments don‟t want to go to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. The question is if you really need to get a compulsory license” (pers. comm., 
2/22/2011). Moreover, these exceptions do not allow China or any other developing 
nation to export products which have been produced with foreign technologies acquired 
through compulsory licensing, to other countries.  
DISCLOSURE OF TECHNOLOGY SECRETS  
Another common trait of China‟s IPR regime, which poses a problem for the 
foreign enterprises, is the weaknesses in the protection of commercial and technological 
trade secrets. This weakness is also burdened by the Anti-trust law provisions which 
require revealing of technological trade secrets to the Chinese authorities before 
authorities allow foreign companies to operate in China. 
One of the experts on the Chinese business practices (pers. comm., 2/16/2011) 
said that: “foreign companies have to file their application for a license before the 
Commerce Department before starting their operations under the Anti-trust law, and 
report to the authorities.” As a requirement, companies are often obliged to reveal their 
technology secrets to the authorities in order to acquire a license for operation. 
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In addition to the requirements of the Anti-trust law, for many projects, in 
particular the manufacture of machinery and equipment, Chinese authorities require 
review of industrial drawings and designs by Chinese design institutes. Moreover, many 
foreign companies are required to train Chinese staff during these projects. The EU China 
IPR SME Held Desk (2008) has asserted that: “these drawings and know‐how may later 
be used by other Chinese projects which wish to duplicate and use the design in other 
locations of China.” 
CHANGING ATTITUTES AND COALITION BUILDING 
Recently, China has been reported to water down its rules that sales to the 
government must go hand-in-hand with technology transfer (Areddy, China as Co-Shaper 
of Global Standards 2010). As regards the public procurement regime, however, the 
increasing vocal criticism of the system by the chieftains of companies like General 
Electric Co., BASF SE and Siemens AG, as well as surveys, signify that these policies 
have not gone away.  
Countries and multi-national companies have become more critical about China„s 
methods to extract foreign technology and to support Chinese standards. 
Although, foreign businesses usually avoid talking openly about problems they 
have in China and backroom negotiation is preferred and press attention typically not 
welcome, many foreign companies have become more outspoken against these practices. 
In 2010, General Electric (GE) CEO Jeffrey Immelt reportedly expressed concerns about 
the uncertainty as to whether China wanted companies to be successful in the Chinese 
market. Furthermore, Jurgen Hambrecht, chairman of BASF, and Peter Loescher, chief 
executive of Siemens, both complained about the need to transfer technology to Chinese 
partners for deals to go ahead, obstructions put up against them in getting access to the 
120 
 
Chinese domestic market, and intellectual property violations, when they met Premier 
Wen Jiabao, alongside German Chancellor Angela Merkel (Oxford Analytica 2010). 
According to a report by Deutsche Presse – Agentur, Jürgen Hambrecht complained that: 
“foreign companies faced „forced disclosure of know-how‟ in order to do business in 
China. That does not exactly correspond to our views of a partnership” (quoted in 
Areddy, Germany‟s BASF: China Critic, Investor 2010).   
One of the important lessons of the WAPI case for China is that a direct 
confrontation with foreign governments and multi-national companies will create 
obstacles to the implementation of mainstream policies of the Chinese government. 
Although, the WAPI case has not been brought to the WTO dispute settling mechanism, 
the US government used enforcement of Article 301 as a threat against China on many 
occasions. This signifies that multi-national companies still have teeth to use against 
China even in the cases that the Chinese policies do not infringe any IPR or it is hard to 
prove violation of international trade laws.  
It is also admissible to evaluate the AVS case under this assumption. Here, China 
tries to convince foreign companies to enter the AVS Working Group and the associated 
patent pool through a combination of soft and hard-line approaches. The companies 
behind „failed‟ standards developed elsewhere, such as TD-CDMA and HD-DVD, have 
become active supporters of the AVS standard. They provided access to platforms and 
technologies developed and standardized in the global arena. The size of the Chinese 
market justifies their actions, even if they may object to some of the terms (China - EU 
Information Technology Standards Research Partnership 2010, 16).  As discussed in the 
previous chapters, attractiveness of the Chinese market, along with the Chinese 
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government‟s IPR regime and informal strategies appear to be the underlying reasons for 
the foreign companies‟ decisions to cooperate with the government in these initiatives. 
The indigenous innovation policies and relevant strategies set the context in 
which foreign companies enter the AVS Working Group and join the patent pool, and/or 
keep their silence for their patents‟ incorporation into Chinese standards and the use of 
the Chinese standards that are not in conformity with the relevant international standards. 
Cliff Reader has also highlighted that he has encouraged foreign companies to 
enter the AVS Working Group and join the patent pool to be a part of the process: “We 
have urged foreign companies to join the AVS patent pool, but it has been the decision of 
the foreign company whether to do so (Some have not)” (pers. comm., 2/22/2011). He 
has also emphasized the government‟s careful strategy of observing the WTO rules and 
learning from other countries: “China has been very careful to observe WTO rules - 
possibly to a fault. The government has urged adoption of AVS, but has not mandated it, 
even though it is a National Standard. I pointed out to the Chinese government that the 
FCC in the US mandated all TVs sold in the US have ATSC tuners. My colleagues were 
worried China could not mandate AVS decoders in TVs under WTO rules” (pers. comm., 
2/22/2011). 
As observed in the AVS case, the most troubling issue for the Chinese policy 
makers appears to build and support a coalition in government circles to support these 
initiatives. However, even such support is provided,  tensions between Ministries can 
continue to undermine the transparency of implementation, even when formal standards 
making procedures have been followed  (China - EU Information Technology Standards 
Research Partnership 2010, 16). 
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In this context, given the mistakes of the WAPI initiative and the new rules of the 
WTO era, the Chinese strategists have envisioned a new strategy.  China has increased its 
participation in the international standards setting bodies. Although, China has been a 
member of the ITU for almost a century, China has only recently increased its 
participation into the union. Between 2008 and 2009, the number of delegates from sector 
member organizations participating in ITU-T Study Group meetings increased from 79 to 
172. Contributions by Chinese Sector Members and Administration grew six fold, from 
97 in 2006 to 583 in 2009. More importantly, China‟s contribution has increased by 
nominating more representatives to serve as study group chairs, vice chairs, reporters etc. 
Moreover, some successful Chinese multinationals, such as Huawei and ZTE have started 
to play an increasing role in international standard setting activities, for instance, by 
sending representatives to international standardization organizations and taking on 
positions of responsibility. It is also noteworthy that experts from two competing 
standards initiatives, that of the MPEG4/H.264 and the AVS, are reported to jointly work 
on the future generations of international codec standards (China - EU Information 

















15 China 176 0 5 
24 Finland 140 35 1 
25 France 164 12 24 
27 Germany 175 1 34 
37 Italy 165 11 13 
38 Japan 173 2 24 
42 South Korea 144 29 4 
52 Netherlands 121 37 3 
63 Russia 149 19 2 
72 Sweden 140 35 6 
73 Switzerland 121 22 4 
80 United Kingdom 170 5 19 
81 United States 160 0 25 
Table 5: China’s Participation in the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission 
2011).  
Although, it is not certain that growing Chinese participation and presence in 
these organizations have the potential to change the balance of power in international 
standards setting, this gives China the leverage to block recognition of international 
standards that are in conflict with Chinese interests.  
Despite the WAPI‟s initially closed encryption codes, as in the case of AVS, 
China has started to rely more on international recognition of Chinese standards by 
submitting their drafts to the attention of other countries through international 
standardization organizations to get feedback from them. However, the overall 
impression is that it is still not clear whether China really uses this kind of feedback from 
the international community in its standards setting activities or merely pretends to be 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
According to Dadgson, Kastelle and Mathews (2006, 96), the traditional strength 
of East Asian technological capabilities lays at the diffusion of existing, rather than 
creation of new technologies. Asia is still highly reliant on science and technology 
created elsewhere. Hence, when analyzing the technology policies of these countries, 
acquisition of foreign technologies stands out as the critical element. 
In evaluating the Chinese policies or strategies for home-made standards 
initiatives, it is instructive to take this perspective into account. In light of this 
perspective, this report has sought to study a particular aspect of the change in China‟s 
technology policy strategies by examining the two major Chinese standards initiatives 
within the framework of China‟s WTO membership.  
Suttmeier, Tan and Yao (2006, 43) have argued that China has benefited little 
from its home-made standards, even though some of them have been approved as 
international standards: “Chinese industry has not collected any royalties from these 
standards, cross licensing of standards between Chinese and foreign companies has yet to 
occur, foreign firms have not turned over their intellectual property as a result of these 
standards, and products based upon these standards have met with only limited 
commercial success.”  According to Kennedy, Suttmeier and Su (2008, 32): 
“expectations that China‟s sheer size could provide sufficient leverage to have its 
standards widely accepted have so far proven unfounded.” 
However, as explored in greater detail in the previous chapters, it is clear from the 
observations of the WAPI and AVS cases that China is still heading to its pre-determined 
goals; protection of the domestic market with Chinese standards as non-tariff barriers, 
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development of royalty free environment for Chinese manufacture through standards, and 
as a last remark acceptance of Chinese standards internationally. China is trying to 
achieve these goals within an international framework set by the WTO regime and 
increasing international scrutiny.  
However, Chinese policy makers do not appear to have a clear goal for the 
Chinese industry to collect royalties for the patents incorporated into the Chinese 
standards. As, such a strategy would contradict with the primary goal of circumventing 
royalty requirements of international standards and promoting Chinese standards 
internationally through providing them without any charge. They basically seem to hope 
to benefit from increasing sales of Chinese products all over the world through 
international acceptance of Chinese standards. 
Many still believe in the future success of Chinese standards in the global 
economy. Linden (2003, 15), for instance, has argued that: “China‟s large market allows 
its policymakers both the scope to pursue local standards and the luxury to let the 
standards find their own way in a semi-closed market. In a smaller economy, the 
dominance of international standards would be assured, but in the large China market, 
complicated by its vast size and a bewildering variety of local regulatory regimes, locally 
developed standards have a real chance to flourish domestically and then perhaps to be 
exported.”  
However, in discussing the AVS initiative, Cliff Reader has stated that he does 
not expect the AVS 1.0 standard to be adopted by any other country or international 
standards setting body, though: “satellite knows no boundaries and Chinese-speaking 
people in other countries will receive AVS broadcasts” (pers. comm., 2/22/2011). 
Nevertheless, as some experts have maintained, Chinese standards might still serve to 
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various sectors, by providing royalty free alternatives to dominant international standards. 
Cliff Reader has perceived a potential for the AVS standard in this regard: “AVS 2.0 is in 
design now, and is the leading candidate for MPEG's new royalty-free codec work” (pers. 
comm., 2/22/2011). 
From the examination of both of the cases, it stands out that China focuses its 
efforts on getting the consent of foreign companies and ensuring their participation to 
stay away from a direct confrontation with foreign governments and disputes under the 
international trade law. As discussed in previous chapters in greater detail, government 
companies or government controlled companies do not hesitate to establish joint ventures 
with foreign companies to access to foreign technology and make it available to serve the 
development of Chinese standards. Moreover, this strategy is also supported by foreign 
companies‟ interest for the well protected Chinese market, specifically the large 
government procurement market. Several foreign companies have established joint 
ventures with domestic companies to gain or keep access to the Chinese market, which 
might have taken a compulsory form.  
For Chinese authorities, industrial growth through exporting manufactured goods 
to outside world is clearly not enough. They want to develop China‟s science and 
technology capacity and own the key technologies for the success of Chinese industries. 
They want foreign companies, either through joint partnerships or various formal and 
informal ways to share their technologies at very low licensing fees. In this sense, they 
also show no tolerance to the private sector over their licensing strategies. These efforts 
seem to be well planned, as they target certain technologies and particular companies 
(The Telecommunications Industry Association, pers. comm., 11/13/2010). 
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Another important observation of Chinese policies and strategies concerning 
Chinese standards is that China‟s efforts to acquire foreign technologies are not always in 
conformity with the WTO rules or principles. However, China‟s new strategies give the 
country the leverage to make it harder for the foreign stakeholders to prove that they 
violate the WTO rules. Patricia Hansen asserted that: “[for foreign technology in 
exchange for contracts for public procurement,] I don‟t think this is an infringement of 
the TRIPS Agreement. You can‟t say people that they cannot waive their rights. In return, 
they are arguably compensated for access to the public procurement market” (pers. 
comm., 2/22/2011).  
However, the critical question here is with this new set of strategies, if China 
promotes the AVS and WAPI standards, which are not mandatory unlike the early WAPI 
initiative, through employing informal strategies. In this sense, the decision of the „Japan-
Trade in Semi Conductors Panel‟ would shed light on legality of Chinese strategies from 
an international perspective. 
In discussing the „Japan-Trade in Semi Conductors Panel,‟ for instance, Patricia 
Hansen has argued that: “there were insufficient incentives for the private [Japanese 
semiconductor] companies and the compliance of private actors are essentially dependent 
upon the government, at least arguably it cannot be said to be in conformity with the 
GATT principles” (pers. comm., 2/22/2011). 
In this specific case, the European Community has claimed that the MITI was 
pressuring Japanese manufacturers through administrative guidance to restrict overall 
export volumes of certain semi-conductors, resulting in severe reduction of supplies, 
delays in the granting of export licenses and other disruptions. Japan‟s goal was to aid the 
US efforts to satisfy Japan's obligations under an arrangement. In fact, it was reported 
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that:  “the MITI Minister had convened an emergency meeting with the Chairman or 
President of each of the ten major semi-conductor companies to impress upon them the 
importance of avoiding dumping in third country markets” (WTO 1988, 9). 
At this panel, Japan defended its policies on the grounds that: “none of the 
measures was legally binding, and the Japanese society was not so feudalistic that non-
binding requests by government would be accepted readily and administrative guidance 
by MITI did not always work” (11). 
However, at the end of the hearings, the Panel noted that: "the practice of 
'administrative guidance' played an important role in the enforcement of the Japanese 
supply restrictions, that this practice was „a traditional tool of Japanese government 
policy based on consensus and peer pressure‟ and that administrative guidance in the 
special circumstances prevailing in Japan could therefore be regarded as a governmental 
measure enforcing supply restrictions.” The Panel concluded that: “in the above 
circumstances, the Japanese Government's measures did not need to be legally binding to 
take effect, as there were reasonable grounds to believe that there were sufficient 
incentives or disincentives for Japanese producers and exporters to conform” (WTO, 28). 
This decision is important in the sense that many believe that China‟s membership 
to the WTO would have a very important impact on China‟s accountability for its future 
administrative behaviors. “For example, if China imposed technical regulations that could 
be proven to be motivated by protectionism, the case could be brought before the WTO‟s 
dispute settlement body. This authority could then impose fines if China was unwilling to 
comply with these rules” (Dolles and Wilmking 2005, 9-10). 
However, this report‟s conclusion is that China‟s WTO membership has not 
brought a leading edge policy change for China, but China has chosen to change its 
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strategies through trial and error and deterrence of international criticism, within the 
restrictions of the WTO. Given the WTO case law, although, China‟s new strategies 
might violate the rules of the WTO. However, China apparently attempts to overcome 
these difficulties by supporting coalitions around its home-made standards initiatives. At 
this point, from the examination of the recent disputes between China and other 
countries, it is viable to say that direct counter-actions by foreign governments appear to 
be more challenging for the Chinese government. 
According to (Slater 2009, 10): “[Chinese agencies and the officials] are still 
learning and experimenting.” Given China‟s goal of becoming a high technology country, 
as Weber, Bach and Newman (2005) has quoted from one Chinese commentator who 
once precisely put it: “we are at the beginning of the standard game, not the end” (cited in 
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